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COMMENT
A RECONSIDERATION OF THE RELIGIOUS
ELEMENT IN ADOPTION
In 1965, the Bureau of Children's Services in New Jersey denied
the application of John and Cynthia Burke to adopt a child because the
Burkes "had no religious affiliation and were not members of any
organized church."' The Bureau relied on regulations requiring that
each applicant designate his religious affiliation and obtain a religious
reference to establish his eligibility to adopt.2 After the Burkes brought
suit to challenge the validity of this requirement, the regulations were
changed to provide that "[1]ack of religious affiliation or of a religious
faith . . . should not be a bar to consideration of any applicants for

adoption."3 The agency thereafter capitulated and placed the child
with them. The adoption was finalized in 1968. 4 In 1969, the Burkes
received custody of a second child, and the agency recommended the
adoption. Nevertheless, in In re "E," the court denied the petition for
a second adoption solely on religious grounds.5
Religion has been and continues to be an important element
the
agency level in the placement of children and at the judicial
on
level in the determination of whether adoption petitions should be
granted or denied. This is so both in states that have statutes requiring
consideration of the religious factor and in states without such laws.
Although several states have recently amended their religious protection laws, and agency practices have become more liberal, the religious
factor in adoption has not been eliminated. And, as In re "E"illustrates, the trend towards liberalization of religious requirements has
been far from uniform.
This emphasis on religion, regardless of where in the adoption
process it manifests itself, creates a number of serious problems of
I In re "E," at 1 (NJ. County Ct. Nov. 2, 1970).
Id. The Bureau did not rely on any statutory religious protection provision.
Id. at 2.
Id.
5 Id. at 6-7. The court, ironically, based its decision on a provision of the New Jersey
3) which guarantees free exercise of religion, concludconstitution (N.J. CONsr. art. I,
ing: "The child should have the freedom to worship as she sees fit and not be influenced
by parents or exposed to the views of prospective parents who do not believe in a Supreme
Being." In re "E," at 6 (NJ. County Ct. Nov. 2, 1970).
2
3
4
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definition, interpretation, and application for the judge and administrator. It cripples the law's ability to respond meaningfully to the other
interests of the parties to adoption proceedings by subordinating
those interests to religious considerations. Moreover, the role played
by religion in adoption is open to serious question in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions concerning state involvement with religious
matters. In examining the emphasis on religion in current statutory
provisions and agency practices, this discussion is confined to nonrelative adoptions of children too young to be influenced by religious
training at the time of placement. 6

BACKGROUND

All states now provide statutory means for qualified adults to
adopt children. With few exceptions, the transfer of parental rights
and obligations is complete upon the granting of a final order of
adoption.7 In recent years, adoption has continued to increase in significance as a means of permanently placing neglected or dependent
children: the total number of adoptions in the United States has grown
more than seventy percent over the last decade, from 96,000 in 1958 to
166,000 in 1968.8 While the percentage of adoptions by relatives has
remained fairly stable at just under fifty percent 9 the number of non6 The Cornell Law Review submitted questionnaires concerning agency policy on
religious matters to public and private sectarian and nonsectarian adoption agencies. Responses were received from 73 agencies representing 47 states. The information derived
from these questionnaires is hereinafter cited as Survey, Adoption Agencies. Additional,
more detailed correspondence was carried on with public agencies representing 24 states.
Questionnaires were also submitted to family court judges in New York State to determine how judges inquire into the religious affiliations of the concerned parties in adoption
proceedings and how they respond to varying factual patterns. Responses were received
from 27 of the 59 counties in New York, although not all judges answered all questions
submitted. Because some of the judges asked that they not be identified by name, the
information derived from the questionnaires is hereinafter cited as Survey, Judges.
7 UNIFORM ADOPTION Acr § 12 is representative in this respect:
(1) After the final decree of adoption is entered the relation of parent and
child and all the rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural relation of the child and parent shall thereafter exist between such adopted child
and the adoptive parents . .. [and the kindred of the adoptive parents]. ...
(2) ... [Tihe natural parents ... shall be relieved of al parental responsibilities for said child and have no rights over such adopted child or to his
property by descent and distribution.
8 BuREAu OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF CoammERcE, STATISTICAL ABsrRAcr or THE
UNtrE STATES: 1970, at 303 (1970).
9 Id.
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relative placements by authorized agencies, as opposed to private placements, has increased substantially.' 0
Modem concepts of adoption indicate that the state has an
interest in providing neglected or dependent children with acceptable
family surroundings 1 and that adoption should be geared to the best
interests of the child.1 2 Such agency practices as favoring sterile adoptive parents over those able to procreate, 13 which reflect a belief that
adoption is principally for the benefit of childless parents,' 4 are rapidly
fading from the scene. 15
In contrast, the persistence of so-called "religious protection"
laws, 16 which directly or indirectly require religious matching between
10 Id. In 1958, out of a total 96,000 adoptions in the country, 51,000 were by nonrelatives. Of these only 27,000 were placed by agencies. In 1965 the figures were 142,000
total, 77,000 nonrelative with 53,000 placements by authorized agencies. In 1968 such
agencies placed 64,000 of the 86,000 total adoptions by nonrelatives, while the overall
figure for adoptions was 166,000. Id.
11 Adoption was originally thought of as a way to provide heirs in a childless

family. In modern times the emphasis in adoption is on the interests of the child
It is primarily a means of creating parent-child relationships for homeless
....
children.
Smith, General Concepts and Basic Philosophy of Adoption, in READINGS IN ADOPTION 1
(I. Smith ed. 1963).
12 E.g., UNIFoRM ADOPTION ACr § 11. Agencies uniformly refer to the standard of "the
best interests of the child" as controlling their particular approach to child placement.
Survey, Adoption Agencies.
13 In New York applicants are required to submit medical evidence about fertility

or sterility as part of the application process. New York Dep't of Social Services, Form
DSS-858 (June 1968). Kansas regulations explicitly prefer sterile couples. Division of Child
Welfare Services, Kansas Dep't of Social Welfare, Guidelines for Families Interested in
Adopting Children 1 (Aug. 1968).
14 An alternative, but less convincing, rationale for favoring sterility is that a fertile

couple giving birth to a natural child after adoption might neglect the adoptive child.
15 North Carolina specifically rejects favoring childless couples: "There is little logic
in any policy which seems to assume that a childless couple is more capable of meeting
the needs of children than is a couple who has already demonstrated the ability to be
successful parents." I North Carolina Dep't of Social Services, Manual-Welfare Programs Division, ch. VI, § II(E)(3)(f), at 21 (July 1969).
Age requirements for adoptive parents have been eased as well. Most states now
merely require some minimum age for adoptive parents and consent of the child above a
certain age. E.g., UNIFORm ADOPTION Acr §§ 3, 7 (21-year age minimum for parents;
consent of child over 12).
16 Religious protection statutes affecting adoption: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-229 (1964);
CAL. WELF. & INSr'Ns CODE § 505 (West 1966); COLO. R v. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-11(4) ,(Supp.
1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-71 (1968); DE.L. COnE ANN. tit. 13, § 911 (1953), as
amended, (Supp. 1969); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2311 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.011 (1969);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2423 (1959); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-15 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-3217 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.60, 235.3(3) (1969); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.473(2) (1969); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.1581 (1968); ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 3795 (Supp. 1970); W. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 67(b) (Supp. 1970); MALss. ANN. LAWS ch.
210, § 5B (Supp. 1970); MicE. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(545)(e) (1962); MNN. STAT. ANN.
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the adoptive parents and the child, runs contrary to liberalizing trends
in child care practice, particularly with respect to infants too young to
have received any religious training. Although anachronistic in appearance, these religious protection laws have retained substantial
vitality.
II
REuGIous PROTECTION LAWS

A. The Statutory Pattern
Typical religious protection statutes provide that when practicable
the administering official shall place the child with persons of the
same religion as that of the child or its natural parents. 17 Some statutes
§ 260.181(8) (1971); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.221 (1962); id. § 475.045(8) (1956); MONT. REV.
CODEs ANN. § 10-510 (1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-216 (1968); Nav. REv. STAT. § 62.220
(1969); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:19 (1964); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 80:4C-26 (1964); N.Y. Dom.
REL. LAW §§ 115-a(2)(g), 116(8)(f), 118-a (McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1970); N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 116 (McKinney 1968), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1970);
N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW § 873 (McKinney 1966), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1970);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 8107.05(E) (Page Supp. 1970); id. § 5108.06 (Page 1970); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 418.280 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § l(d) (1963); id. tit. 11, § 252 (1965); id.
§ 269-409 (Allegheny County); R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-141 (1970); id. § 15-7-13 (Supp.
1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1095.21 (Supp. 1970); id. § 15-1416 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAws
ANN. § 26-8-42 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-1415 (1955); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 26.82.060, 26.82.090 (1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-2-1 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.82(8)
(1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-110 (1965).

New Mexico law is unique in terms of its concept of "protection." It has no religious
restrictions upon adoption, but in the case of commitments of orphaned children to
institutions, "due regard shall be had by the court to commit such child to such institution as will not proselytize or interfere with its religious belief." N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-9-8 (1968).
17 Pennsylvania law is representative of most protection laws, although many do not

place sectarian institutions in parity with families as alternative custodians:
The court shall place a child, as far as possible, under the care, guidance
and control of persons [having] the same religious belief as the parents of the
child, or with some association or society which is controlled by persons of such

In all cases where it can properly be done, the child shall
religious belief ....
be placed in a suitable family home and become a member of the family by legal
adoption, or otherwise.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 252 (1965). Other statutes substitute "like religious faith" for
"same religious belief" (e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3217 (1956)), or "whenever practicable" for
"as far as possible" (e.g., Nrv. REv. STAT. § 62.220 (1969)). At least one agency has seized
upon the "same religious belief" language in a state statute as implied authority to relax
matching requirements on the theory that religious belief is a more liberal rubric than
"faith" or formal affiliation. Letter from Arthur Roberge, Assistant Supervisor of Child
and Family Services, New Hampshire Dep't of Health and Welfare, to the Cornell Law
Review, Nov. 18, 1970.
In most states, differences in language appear to have little importance. The Iowa

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:780

set up hierarchies of indices, giving primary emphasis to the religion of
the natural parents, followed by "the religion of the child" if the
religions of the natural parents are different, and finally referring back
to "the religion of either parent" if the religion of the child is not
ascertainable.18 Other statutes refer only to the religion of the natural
parents or only to the religion of the child, in the latter case leaving it
to the court or agency to find the spiritual and factual nexus necessary
to fix the child's religion. 19 It does not appear, however, that statutes
distinguish between infants and children who have had some religious
training.20 Some states make specific provision in their protection laws
provisions use different phrases to control essentially the same activity. IowA CODe ANN.
§ 232.60 (1969) (court placing a child; "same religious belief"); id. § 235.3(3) (state employees placing a child; "same religious faith'); Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.181(3) (1971).
18 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2311 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2423 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-3217 (1956); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13:1581 (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.221 (1962);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 62.220 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-41 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-1095.21 (Supp. 1970); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-110 (1965).
19 Religion of Parents: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-229 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. Rnv.
§ 17-71 (1968) (parent or parents); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 911(a) (1953) (mother, when
child born out of wedlock); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 282.60, 285.3(3) (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.181(3) (1971); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-216 (1968); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:19 (1964);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 80:4C-26 (1964) (parent or parents); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.06
(Page 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § l(d) (1963); id. tit. 11, § 252 (1965); id. § 269-409
(Allegheny County); S.D. Coan'LED LAws ANN. § 26-8-42 (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-1 (1966) (parents or relatives); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.82(3) (1957).
Religion of Child: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.011 (1969) (the child and adoptive parents
shall be of the same religion); IuL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-15 (Smith-Hurd 1966); N.Y.
FAMILY CT. Aar § 116 (McKinney 1968), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1970) (amendment
adding parental preference provision); N.Y. Soc. SERvIcEs LAw § 373 (McKinney 1966), as
amended, (McKinney Supp. 1970) (amendment adding parental preference provision).
Some statutes refer to the religion of the parents or the child. CAL. WELT. & INST'NS
CODE § 505 (West 1966); ORE. REv. STAT. § 418.280 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-1415
(1955).
In many states, differences in language that make the parent's religion determinative
or that, alternatively, focus merely on the child's, may be of no consequence. New York
has long used the child's religion as its statutory guide, yet New York courts have consistently looked to parental religion. E.g., In re Anonymous, 207 Misc. 240, 137 N.Y.S.2d
720 (County Ct. 1955); cf. In re Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281
(1958). Where a child is too young to have received any religious training, "the religion
of the child" may have meaning only if a court recognizes ritualized entry into a religion,
such as baptism, as an index of affiliation. For a discussion of the problems involved
in such dedication, see text accompanying notes 147-57 infra.
20 As of July 1969, Maryland became the first major exception to this rule. Its new
law emphasizes the religious interests of the adoptive child which may have relevance
to placement. It provides that the court may place the child without regard to religion
if it "determines that the infant does not have sufficient religious background, training or
beliefs to be a factor in the adoption... " MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 67(b) (Supp. 1970).
A reasonable construction of the new law would automatically preclude matching in the
case of a new-born child.
The Delaware statute uses the language "same religion as the natural mother or of
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for the expressed wishes of the natural parent.2 '
Even states without statutes expressly requiring religious matching
may interject the religious factor indirectly. In Washington, for example, although the law is silent as to matching, the petition for adoption and the report of the child's next friend ad litem must state the
religious affiliation of both the petitioners and adoptive child.22 Michigan similarly requires an investigation into religious backgrounds by
the child's next friend before the adoption can be granted.23 Maryland merely directs the court to consider the religious background of
all the parties involved, except where the "infant does not have suffi24
cient religious background... to be a factor."
Statutes also differ with respect to the location of protection provisions and the stage in the process of selecting adoptive parents at
which religion becomes significant. Religious factors may appear in
the religion in which she has reared the child or allowed it to be reared," thus merely
providing an alternative to imputation of parental religion in the case of the child old
enough to have had a religious initiation or training. DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 13, § 911(a)
(1953). However, in cases where the child is born in wedlock the statute drops any
reference to religious training and specifies matching with the religion of either parent.
Id. § 911(b). The Delaware statute is rare in that it permits matching with the religion
of only one of the adoptive parents and because it expressly provides that religious
matching is not required when not in the child's best interests. Id. § 911(d) (Supp. 1969).
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 911(a) (1953) (mother may specify a religion or declare
she is indifferent); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.011 (1969) (parents may give written consent to the
placement of the child with adoptive parents of a different religion); N.Y. FAnLy Cr. Acr.
§ 116(g) (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW § 373(7) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
In the absence of an expression of parental preference, Rhode Island authorizes the
state to decide whether to place the child in an adoptive home according to religion.
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-7-13 (Supp. 1970) (decision to be exercised in the child's best
interests). The Rhode Island provision is unclear, however, and its practical effect may
be considerably diluted by a separate section directing the family court to impute religion
to dependent children for the purposes of placement with a private society, agency, or
institution. Id. § 14-1-41 (1970). Kentucky law is also unclear as to the impact of parental
preference: "[No placement shall be disapproved on the basis of religious, ethnic, or
interfaith background of the adoptive applicant, if such placement is made with consent
of the parent." KY. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 199.473(2) (1970). Massachusetts will not honor
parental religious wishes if placement would not be in the "best interests of the child."
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 210, § 5B (Supp. 1970).
Where not explicitly provided by statute, many states take administrative notice of

parental preferences in placing children under the statutory matching requirement. E.g.,,
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 36253 (1969)

("[elxception

can be made in accordance with the

expressed wishes of the parent(s)"); GA. uru.Es & REGs. ch. 200, § 3-3-.03(3)(b)(iv)(3) (1970)
("[placement with those w]hose religious affiliation is similar to that of the natural parents
unless written consent providing otherwise has been secured from the natural parents').
Even without express authority in regulations, most placement agencies make it a practice
to respect parental waivers to some degree. Note 89 and accompanying text infra.
22 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.32.060, 26.32.090 (1965).
23 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(545)(e) (1962).

24 M. ANN. CoDE-art. 16, § 67(b) (Supp. 1970).
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adoption laws,25 juvenile or family court laws,26 social welfare laws, 27
and domestic relations laws.28 New York has a religious protection
provision in its constitution. 29 Inconsistent laws may be found in a
single jurisdiction; although Montana has incorporated the enlightened
nonreligious stance of the Uniform Adoption Act in its adoption law,30
it has nevertheless retained religious protection provisions affecting
adoption in its juvenile court act.3 1
Statutes and regulations relating to administrative activity take
similarly varied stances concerning the religious aspects of adoption
practice. Administrators may be required to match religions only when
placing children declared by a judicial official to be neglected or
dependent upon the state for care, 32 or when placing all children,
whether for foster care or adoption.m
B. Judicial Administration of Religious Protection Laws
The variety of judicial attitudes towards religious protection
policies belies any apparent uniformity in language between statutes.3 4
Differences in judicial attitudes within states are especially significant
because they give the same statute an inconsistent application. 85 This
25 E.g., DEt.. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 911 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
26 E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1581 (1968).

27 E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERvIcEs LAw § 373 (McKinney 1966), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1970).
28 E.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw §§ 115-(a)(2)(g), 116(3)(f), 118-a (McKinney 1964), as
amended, (McKinney Supp. 1970).
29 N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 32.
30 MONT. Ray. CODs ANN. §§ 61-201 to -218 (1970).
31 Id. § 10-510 (1968) states that the court "may, as far as practicable," provide that
familial or institutional guardians appointed for neglected or dependent children conform to the religious faith of the parents of the child. These guardians later appear in
court in loco parentis to assent to any future adoption of the child.
Religious protection provisions are even more obscure when, although statutory law
is silent on the question, administrative regulations provide for matching. E.g., 1 North
Carolina Dep't of Social Services, supra note 15, § II(E)(3)(c), at 19.
32 E.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5103.06 (Page 1970).
83 E.g., OR. Ray. STAT. § 418.280 (Supp. 1969).
34 The differences presented in Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianship
and Custody, 54 COLum. L. REv. 376 (1954), have continued to the present, albeit reduced
somewhat by statutory changes in some states that formerly followed a policy of strict
matching. Section III infra.
35 In New York, "different judges in different counties, and sometimes different
judges in the same county, follow individual policies on the question of religious
matching." R. ISAAC, ADOPTING A CHILD TODAY 105-06 (1965). Cf. Broeder & Barrett, Impact
of Religious Factors in Nebraska Adoptions, 38 Nra. L. REV. 641 (1959). Despite the
recent New York amendment establishing recognition of parental preferences in matching
(text accompanying notes 76-84 infra), one agency has already complained that some
judges are refusing to apply any relaxed standard (Survey, Adoption Agencies).
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divergence in judicial views is best reflected by the various interpretations given the "when practicable" provision in religious matching
requirements.
"Mandatory" constructionists contend that religious diversity is
a bar to adoption when parents of the desired faith, eligible and willing
to adopt, exist in the community.3 6 This interpretation deemphasizes
considerations such as the strength of the familial bonds that may
have developed between child and adoptive parent during the interlocutory custodial period prior to formal adoption.87 Although a
The judges sampled in the Cornell Law Review survey demonstrated little agreement
on the substantive content and policies underlying the state's religious protection statutes.
The most remarkable aspect of this diversity is its persistence, even in factual situations
where the state law would appear clearest. When asked whether they would permit a
couple of one religion to adopt a child whose parent was of a different religion and who
had expressed a wish that the child be raised in that religion, eight judges said that the
religious diversity would be an automatic bar to the adoption, seven said their reaction
would be extremely unfavorable, seven said unfavorable, four said only slightly unfavorable, and one said the diversity would have no effect on his decision. Conversely,
when asked how they would react to the adoption of a child whose mother was religiously
affiliated by persons who were atheists or had no religious affiliation, when the mother
expressly consented to the adoption, 16 judges said the diversity would have no effect on
their decisions. However, one judge said his reaction would be extremely unfavorable,
seven said unfavorable, and three said only slightly unfavorable even though the state's
parental preference provision may leave no room for disapproval under these circumstances.
The fissure widens when the facts are less clear. Where the child is a foundling with no
ascertainable religion and the adoptive parents are atheists or have no religious affiliation,
one judge said there would be an automatic bar to the adoption, three said their
reactions would be extremely unfavorable, nine said unfavorable, three said only slightly
unfavorable, and 10 said the religious issue would have no effect on their decisions.
Survey, Judges.
36 In In re Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 650, 121 N.E.2d 843, 844-45 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 942 (1955), the court noted that "there are . . . many Catholic couples of fine
family life and excellent reputation who have filed applications with the Catholic
Charities Bureau for the purpose of adopting Catholic children .... " The court concluded that it therefore was practicable to match religions.
In In re Duarte, 331 Mass. 747, 122 N.E.2d 890 (1954), the court found that the existence of potential petitioners of the same faith as the child could not be recognized by
judicial notice, holding that the party opposing the petition had the burden of showing
that matching was practicable. But see Ex parte Frantuin, 214 Md. 100, 133 A.2d 408
(1956).
37 The court in Ex parte Frantum, 214 Md. 100, 102, 133 A.2d 408, 410 (1956), denied
the petition despite its finding that the petitioners were "fine people, have a good home,
and have done an excellent job in raising the child from a sickly child to good health."
The mandatory construction also deemphasizes other temporal consequences of matching. In In re Starr, 24 N.Y.2d 1011, 250 N.Ed 240, 302 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969), the court
failed to discuss the harmful effects of allowing the children to grow up in the community
that had knowledge of the tragic deaths of the children's parents. On essentially the same
facts, a Pennsylvania court reached a contrary conclusion by stressing this aspect of the

consequences of matching. Commonwealth ex rel. Kuntz v. Stackhouse, 176 Pa. Super. 361,
108 A.2d 73 (1954).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:780

minority position among states with case law on the subject, it is at
least supported by a fair reading of the "when practicable" language
and is expressly required by statute in one state.38 Other courts reject
the mandatory approach, reasoning that although religion should
receive consideration when adoptions are granted, the "when practicable" clause gives the judge discretion to disregard religious considerations if necessary in the child's best interests. 3 9 This "discretionary"
construction recognizes religion as one among a number of factors
that must be weighed in order to determine the best interests of the
child.
Neither approach is entirely satisfactory. Although the discretionary approach allows the judge to play down religion as a factor
when it is clearly contrary to the best interests of the child, the burden
of evaluating religious considerations in the formulation of the best
38 N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Aar § 116(e) (McKinney 1963) provides that religious matching
is practicable if either a suitable person or a "duly authorized institution" of the
proper religion is available. It thus treats institutions as equivalent to available adoptive
homes for the general purposes of its protection formulation. New York law arguably
requires placement with an available institution when adoptive parents of the desired
religion are not available and when the natural parent or parents have not waived the
religious matching requirement under the recently enacted parental preference provision.
Id. § 116(g) (McKinney Supp. 1970). This is dearly true if a judge finds that the unrepealed remnants of § 116 of the Family Court Act or the existing constitutional provision control in any given situation. One state legislator has severely criticized the
practical consequences of such a strict approach to religious matching:
While the . . . law does not mandate that agendes keep children in foster
homes for their entire childhood on the ground that no adoptive home of the
same religion is available, this is what happens. It is known to happen even if
the mother of the child might wish the child to have the advantage of being
reared in an adoptive home though it be of a different religion.
Children are thus deprived, of a home of their own simply because no qualified persons of the alleged religion of the child are available. Many children
are given a religion simply because their parents may have nominally been
members of that religion although they do not practice it, or because a local
Department of Welfare may have arbitrarily given a certain religion to an
abandoned child.
Memorandum of Stanley Fink with Reference to an Act To Amend the Domestic Relations Law, the Sodal Services Law, and the Family Court Act in Relation to Religious
Permission in Adoptions 2 (undated).
Recently, Maine and Rhode Island repealed their versions of mandatory clauses
in favor of alternative formulations. Note 55 infra.
89 E.g., Stone Adoption, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 730, 733 (County Ct. 1960), quoting Royer
Adoption, 34 Del. Co. 402, 411 (Pa. County Ct. 1946):
"[Imt is generally desirable in adoption cases to have children adopted into homes
of the same religious faith as their natural parents, but such fact alone will not be
permitted to prevent adoptions by persons of another faith if such adoption will
best promote the child's welfare."
See also Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 261, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957); In re Kure, 197
Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936).
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interests of the child remains. 40 Both approaches, mandatory and
discretionary, suffer from the difficulties inherent in identifying religions and determining their import in a given case, 41 and both approaches present the problem of drawing doctrinal distinctions between
one religion and another where the religions of the biological parents
are not the same.4 Parental preference statutes or equivalent judicial
holdings that give effect to expressed preferences of the biological parents may solve these definitional problems. However, absent an expression of parental preference, the presumption is that the parents
favor an imputation of their religion to the child for the purposes of protection statutes. Among states with matching statutes, only
in Maine, where the statute provides for parental preference as an
alternative to a complete disregard of religious matching, is the presumption explicitly otherwise. 43
III
TRENDS

In the 1950's a number of cases graphically demonstrated the
basic disharmony between public temporal concerns and religious
considerations in the adoption process, 44 leading commentators to
40 Delaware's protection provision explicitly recognizes the conflict between the
temporal interests of the child in placement and religious matching requirements: "Whenever . . . [the matching requirements] appear to create a hardship for the child to be
[the court] may, in
adopted in obtaining a suitable and prompt adoptive placement ....
its discretion, waive these requirements in the best interests of the child." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 911(d) (Supp. 1969).
41 If the religion of the mother is significant, what weight should be attached to
her avowal of religious belief (e.g., Catholicism) subsequent to a statement that she
embraced no religious faith? In re Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d
281 (1958). What should the court make of the fact that, albeit a Catholic, she is not a
"good" Catholic? Id.; In re Goldman, 531 Mass. 647, 649, 121 N.E2d 843, 844 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955). If the religion of the child is crucial, does a subsequent
Catholic baptism supersede a circumcision? In re Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 121 N.YS.2d 12
(Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953). What weight should be given to parental expressions purporting
to change the child's religion? In re Israel, 24 Misc. 2d 1089, 206 N.Y..2d 467 (Dom.

Rel. Ct. 1960); In re Anonymous, 207 Misc. 240, 136 N.Y.S.2d 720 (County Ct. 1955).
42 Text accompanying notes 149-55 infra.
43 ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3795 (Supp. 1970).

44 Three of the most celebrated cases arose in New York and Massachusetts. In In re
Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1951), the court took children

from a Jewish adoption agency after a finding that their mother, adjudged unfit, was
Catholic and that the children had been baptized Catholic. The mother had boarded

the children with a woman for two years, had contributed to their support, and had
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extrapolate trends and predict that mandatory approaches to imputation formulas would have harsh consequences. They believed that a
decrease in the number of available adoptive parents caused by strict
religious matching requirements would correspondingly reduce the
adoptive child's chances for the best possible home in the shortest
45
possible time.
The substantive problems remain identical today, but alterations
in the "market" aspects of adoption have brought new ills into focus,
while perhaps softening the impact of religion on categories of children
currently in great demand. Normal, young Caucasian children, even
in states with matching requirements, currently have little trouble
finding homes due to increased demand.40 Handicapped, older, and
minority group children, however, continue to suffer from the additional burden of religious restrictions where exceptions are not made
given instructions to "keep the children or send them to a Catholic home." Id. at 375,
105 N.Y.S.2d at 717. The children were committed to a Jewish agency after their
temporary custodian's representation of their Jewish faith. The court decided that it
was still "practicable" to change institutions under the New York protection statute and
that the children had a birthright to be raised in their natural mother's religion.
In In re Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958), the New
York Court of Appeals granted adoption of a child by a Protestant couple, notwithstanding evidence introduced by the natural mother of her Catholicism. The mother had
previously signed an affidavit declaring that she embraced no religious faith, and custody
was awarded to the Protestant couple. When the mother sought to regain custody more
than a year after giving the child up, the Protestant couple petitioned to adopt the
child. The court accepted the original affidavit of the mother at face value and found
no religious diversity for the purposes of New York law. However, the petitioners
promised to raise the child as a Catholic.
In In re Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942
(1955), the court upheld the objections of a guardian ad litem to the adoption of twin
infants by a Jewish couple, although the natural mother had consented in writing to
the adoption with full knowledge of the religion of the prospective parents. Basing its
decision on a reading of the now-repealed religious protection statute, the court rejected
the mother's right as a natural parent to "change" the religion of her children by consent and preserved an imputation of her Catholicism to them by operation of law. The
court also refused to hold that the mother had ceased "to be a Catholic, even [though]
she failed to live up to the ideals of her religion." Id. at 649, 121 N.E.2d at 884.
46 One commentator noted:
The laws of the various states, and the pressures exerted by religious interest
groups even where the laws leave some freedom of action, are becoming ever
more severe at the very time when the change in supply and demand makes it
necessary as never before that the requirements of religious matching be relaxed.... [I]n actual practice, state laws . . . ensure that in most states religious
lines will not be crossed, even when it means that placement will be delayed or
the child placed in a less suitable home.
R. IsAAC, supra note 35, at 218.
46 Agencies throughout the country report waiting lists of applicants for these children. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 7.
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in their behalf.4 7 The same increased demand for the supply of white

children has worsened the position of the religiously disfavored adoptive parent.48 Agencies that give first preference to parents of
the same religion as that assigned-the child may effectively be barring
applicants whose religion, or lack thereof, does not match that of the
available children.
Changes in the legal environment of adoption have perhaps
worked more uniformly to reduce some of the harmful effects of
religious restrictions. These changes are evident in statutory reform
and, to a lesser degree, in agency responses to evolving standards of
child care.
Statutory reform, in format, has ranged from abolishing protection
provisions altogether 9 to engrafting parental preference provisions
onto existing law.8 0 In effect, it has ranged from linking religious concerns with a temporal public interest to making confusing law even
more confusing.5 1 Prior to 1967, Maine had one of the harshest religious matching statutes on record,5 2 which required matching in
5 83
every case "where a suitable family of such faith [could] be found.
It provided for institutional placement in the alternative, and, lacking
an institution, it begrudgingly allowed for temporary placement until
47 One official has commented:
There are some delays because of the religious requirements. . . . This is not
true with white children who move into adoption fairly easily, but it prevails
among the Negro group. Although we try not to make too many transfers, there
are times when we decide that it is more importafit to have a good home for a
child than what religion he will be taught.
Letter from Charles 0. Yost, Director of the Division of Foster Care Services, Louisiana
Dep't of Public Welfare, to the Cornell Law Review, Nov. 18, 1970.
48 Comments from the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services are
instructive on this point:
Generally speaking a child's religion is not much of a factor in difficulty of placement, for if a home of a particular faith is not readily available the child is
placed in another faith. However looked at from the other side-that of the
adoptive parents-it is true that for applicants of some religions we seldom
have children of matching faiths.
Letter from Frank Newgent, Administrator of the Division of Family Services, Wisconsin
Dep't of Health and Social Services, to the Cornell Law Review, Nov. 19, 1970.
49 Oklahoma repealed its protection law, applicable to adoptions through the courts,
in 1968. Act of May 3, 1968, ch. 282, § 502, [1968] Okla. Laws 461. Arizona repealed a
similar provision in its juvenile court act in 1970. Act of May 19, 1970, ch. 223, § 1,
[1970] Ariz. Laws 1107.
50 N.Y. FAMILY CT AcT § l16(g) (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.Y. Soc. SaRvicFs LAw
§ 873(7) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
61 See the discussion of the New York amendments is Section IV infra.
82 Mg. R V. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 8795 (1965).
83 Id.
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"a suitable family" of the proper faith could be found.54 In its 1967
reform, Maine eliminated all matching except where requested by the
natural parents. 55 A recent change in Massachusetts law takes one
further step by providing that placements will not be made pursuant
to religious requests of natural parents where contrary to the best
interests of the child.56 Both of these changes narrow the scope of the
state interest in the religious issue to accommodating the expressed
wishes of natural parents. An entirely different approach has been
taken by Maryland, which formerly required matching except where
the parents specifically consented to placement without regard to
religion. 57 Maryland statutory law now disregards parental preference,
deemphasizes matching, and concentrates specifically on the importance
of religion to the child. The court "may consider the religious background, training and beliefs of the natural parents, the adopting
parents and the infant" unless it "determines that the infant does not
have sufficient religious background, training or beliefs to be a factor in
the adoption . . .,,5
IV
RELIGIOUS PRoTEcTIoN m NEw YoRE
New York has for some time had the most pervasive system of
religious matching in the nation. Matching requirements appear in
54 Id.
55 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.

22, § 3795 (Supp. 1970) (emphasis added) reads, in part:

Any child ... shall ... be placed [whether for foster care or adoption] in a
family of the same religious faith as that requested in writing by the parents ...
where a suitable family of such faith can be found . . . . If such family cannot
be found or if no request is made by the parent . . . then such child shall be
placed ... as may be determined by the department or agency involved to be in
the best interest of the child.
The use of the language "shall . . . be placed" thus constitutes the only remaining
discordant note in Maine law, leaving open, as it does, the possibility of a bar to pairing the child and an available applicant solely because of the parents' religious preferences. Rhode Island law was as harsh as prior Maine law until, in a 1970 amendment, the
state repealed its mandatory construction clause, which made matching practicable even
when an institution of the desired faith was the only custodian available. Although it
now provides for placement, when practicable, according to parental preferences, in the
absence of such preference the Rhode Island statute places the burden of choosing the
future religious affiliation of the child upon the agency: "In the event that the natural
parent(s) waive the right to designate the religion of his child such right shall become
vested in the governmental child-placing agency to be exercised in the best interests of
the child." R.I. GEN. LAwS ANN. § 15-7-13 (Supp. 1970).
56 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 210, § 5B (Supp. 1970).
57 MD.ANN. CODE art. 16, § 67 (1966).
58 MD.ANN. CODE art. 16, § 67(b) (Supp. 1970).
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the state constitution, 59 the Family Court Act, 0 the Social Services
Law, 1 and the Domestic Relations Law. 2 These requirements control
state and private agency placements and final court orders of adoption.
The Family Court Act, which is ultimately relevant to all adoption
proceedings, directs the court to match religions "when practicable" in
order to ensure that "in the care, protection, guardianship, discipline
or control of any child his religious faith shall be preserved and protected by the court."6 3 A mandatory construction clause provides that
matching is practicable if there is a "proper or suitable person" or
a "duly authorized association, agency, society or institution" of the
same "religious faith or persuasion as that of the child" available to
adopt or care for the child.e4 The court must "state or recite the facts"
underlying any determination that matching is not practicable.6 5 In
addition, the Domestic Relations Law allows courts to grant petitions,

brought by any person or authorized agency on behalf of the child, to
abrogate adoptions upon evidence of "an attempt to change or the

actual making of a change of or the failure to safeguard the religion of
the child.., on the part of the adoptive parents ....

,68

The Court of Appeals has indicated that only in the most exceptional circumstances will the matching scheme be circumvented
through the "when practicable" provision. In In re Maxwell, 7 the
court avoided a direct confrontation with the protection law by ac59 N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 32 provides:

When any court having jurisdiction over a child shall commit it or remand
it to an institution or agency or place it in the custody of any person by parole,
placing out, adoption or guardianship, the child shall be committed or remanded

or placed, when practicable, in an institution or agency governed by persons, or
in the custody of a person, of the same religious persuasion as the child.
60 N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 116 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1970),
places religious restrictions on judicial commitment of children to private institutions,
placements made by such institutions with persons other than natural parents, judicial
appointment of guardians, except guardians ad litem, and the granting of petitions of
adoption.
61 N.Y. Soc. SERvicEs LAw § 373 (McKinney 1966), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1970), places religious restrictions on placements of children with private institutions,
placements of children by private institutions with institutions or persons, except relatives within the second degree, and the appointment of guardians.
62 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 118-a (McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1970), provides for the abrogation of adoptions under certain circumstances.
63 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Aar §§ 116(a)-(d) (McKinney 1963).
64 Id. § 116(e).
65 Id. § 116(f).
66 N.Y. DoM. REtL. LAw § 118-a (McKinney Supp. 1970). The previous law, amended
in 1970, used the same language, except that it referred to "foster" rather than "adoptive"
parents. This attempt to inject the state into the private religious affairs of families is unwarranted and unconstitutional. Notes 140-45 and accompanying text infra.
67 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 170 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958).
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cepting the natural mother's affidavit that she embraced no religious
faith over her later professions of Catholicism. In Starr v. De Rocco,68
however, the court seemed to disregard language in the Maxwell
decision implying that the "when practicable" provision should be
given a discretionary interpretation in the best interests of the child.6 9
In Starr the Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, the appellate
division's award of custody7" to the paternal aunt and uncle of two
children whose father had murdered their mother and then committed
suicide. The paternal aunt and uncle, of the same Catholic religion
as the natural parents, lived in the town where the murder-suicide had
occurred. At special term the court had awarded custody to the Starrs,
the Episcopalian maternal aunt and uncle of the children, on the ground
that the childrens' best interests would be served by such placement:
Not only was the court most favorably impressed [by the maternal
aunt and uncle] when they appeared before the court, but the court
finds that they are of a temperament to best care for the children.
... [A]nd in placing custody with them, they will be removed from
the locale of the tragedy which befell their parents, and thus, in
the future, spared possible embarrassment and degradation. 71
The appellate division's reversal stressed the constitutional mandate
relating to matters of custody, interpreting it to mean that "unless
some compelling reason requires otherwise no child shall be placed
with a guardian of a religious persuasion other than that of the
child." 72 The court found that it was practicable to match religions
since there were "available and willing persons . . . who profess the
same religious faith as that of the children and against whom no
cause for rejection exists. '73 The appellate division rejected the Starr's
claim to the children, even though they agreed to raise the children as
Catholics.7 4 The mandatory construction thus given the constitutional
68 24 N.Y.2d 1011, 250 N.E.2d 240, 802 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969).
69 In Maxwell the court said: "The presence in the statute of the words 'when
practicable' was to enable the court to relax the requirement in the unusual case such
as the one before us." 4 N.Y.2d at 434, 151 N.E.2d at 851, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 284-85.
70 Starr v. De Rocco, 29 App. Div. 2d 662, 286 N.Y.S.2d 313 (2d Dep't 1968), aff'd
nwm., 24 N.Y.2d 1011, 250 N.E.2d 240, 802 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969).
71 Quoted in 24 N.Y.2d at 1013, 250 N.E.2d at 241, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
72 29 App. Div. 2d at 663, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
We think this constitutional provision means more than a mere extension of
authority to exercise discretion as to the religious aspect in custody matters.
Here
That authority already existed without expression in the Constitution ....
there is no ... compelling reason to avoid the constitutional mandate.
Id. at 662-63, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
73 Id.
74 The dissent of Judges Hopkins and Benjamin pointed to the Starrs' promise,
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matching requirement by the Starr court will likely have a similar
impact on adoption, which comes within the ambit of the same constitutional provision.
Identical parental preference provisions were added to the Family
Court Act and Social Services Law in 1970. 75 The amendment of the
Family Court Act purports to read into every subsection of the old
religious protection provision the added condition that the "provisions
... shall.., be applied so as to give effect to the religious wishes of
the natural ... parents .... ,,7 The amendment is designed primarily
to effectuate expressed, judicially determined, or presumed parental
wishes. 77 However, these recent changes in New York law may not
bring about the essential realignments effected by other state reforms.
First, New York's new parental preference amendment must survive
scrutiny under the religious protection section of the state constitution.7 8 Second, the statutory mandate has been confused by the legislature's decision to engraft the new provision onto the old, complicated
body of religious protection law. Although the new amendment provides that matching is required only "so far as consistent with the best
interests of the child," it also provides that matching is required
"where practicable"; 7 the mandatory construction clause defining
the latter phrase s has not been repealed by the new amendment. The
made at trial, to raise the children as Catholics, and to the confusing religious background of the mother and her brother, Mr. Starr, as evidence that made a doctrinal stand
on the religious issue unconvincing. Both Starr and his sister, the natural mother, had
been born of Jewish parents and subsequently baptized and confirmed as Catholics. The
natural mother married a Catholic, De Rocco; Starr married an Episcopalian and was
converted to that religion. Id.
75 N.Y. FAmIY Cr. Acr § 116(g) (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.Y. Soc. SEwRcs LAW
§ 373(7) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
76 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 116(g) (McKinney Supp. 1970). By adding the parental
preference provision as the last subsection, the amendment leaves all of the provisions of
the old act intact.
77 The memorandum accompanying the New York bill to the Assembly floor noted
that the mandatory interpretation of existing law violated constitutionally protected
religious freedoms of the biological parents to determine their child's religion and that
it was a law respecting the establishment of religion. Proposed Legislation with Respect

to Religion in Adoption: Memorandum in Explanation 2 (Dec. 3, 1969); accord, Adoptive
Parents Comm., Inc., Memorandum with Reference to an Act To Amend the Family
Court Act and Social Service Law, in Regard to Religious Persuasion in Adoption (1970).
78 The parental preference law is arguably unconstitutional under the mandatory
construction given the New York constitutional matching provision in Starr. However, the
language of the constitution does not itself compel a mandatory construction, so that an
amendment to the New York constitution should not be necessary to implement discretionary parental preference.
79 N.Y. FAMILy Cr. ACT § 116(g) (McKinney Supp. 1970).

so Text accompanying note 64 supra.
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crucial question is how the two statutory phrases are to be reconciled.
One possibility is that the best interests of the child is an independent
factor and that even if matching is "practicable" under the statutory
definition, it is not required if the child's best interests are not served.81
On the other hand, the best interests of the child may be defined
narrowly to require preservation of its religious identity. Under this
approach, once matching is determined to be "practicable," the child's
temporal welfare would receive no independent consideration and
matching would be automatically required.8 2 The legislature's failure
to resolve this ambiguity and to set out the priorities among the
interests of the child, the biological parents, and the adoptive parents8 3
provides greater leeway for the already significant diversity of lower
court interpretations of the state's matching law.84
A second recent amendment to New York law broadens the provision of the Domestic Relations Law that allows the abrogation of an
adoption if the new parents attempt to change the religious affiliadon of the child. 5 By thus unequivocally extending the religious
81 REPORT Or THE JOINT

LEGISLATIVE COMMITEE ON

CHILD CAE

NEEDs, 1968 N.Y.

Doc No. 6, at 175, recognized the potential conflict between a mandatory matching
requirement and the child's best interests:
LEG.

The Committee, after due deliberation, expressed its support for legislation
to permit adoption in the best interests of the child, rather than the existing
practice of requiring adoption placements with persons of the same religion
as the child or the child's natural parents.
82 Another possible interpretation is that the best interests of the child is an operative factor only when an express parental preference is stated. Under this interpretation
the strict matching requirements of the old law are controlling when no preference is
stated unless altered by evidence to rebut the presumption that the biological parents
wish the child to be brought up in the religion attributed to them.
83 In Starr, the dissenting opinion criticized the majority's disregard for the child's
best interests:
[I]f the Appellate Division majority intended that cause for rejection must be found
in the personal character of the De Roccos [who were given custody] to warrant
awarding custody to the Starrs [who were found the better parents by the trial
court], I believe they were mistaken. Such an interpretation of [the constitution]
... would require awarding custody to persons of the same religion as the children
in all cases, unless the prospective custodians were total social and moral misfits.
Such a view constitutes a blatant disregard for the welfare of the child for purely
religious reasons and might well be considered to violate the First Amendment
24 N.Y.2d at 1015, 250 N.E.2d at 243, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 839 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
84 New York does not have state regulations controlling adoption practices in the
counties, thus leaving it to the county judge and the county welfare agency to interpret
New York's increasingly confusing body of adoption law. Some local agencies still maintain the practice of assigning children of unknown religious background a religion on a
rotating basis. Letter from Peter J. Kasius, Associate Social Services Consultant (Adoption)
of the Bureau of Children's Agency Services, New York Dep't of Social Services, to the
Cornell Law Review, Dec. 10, 1970.
85

N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW

§ 118-a (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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scrutiny of the state past the time of granting a petition for adoption,
New York has taken a step of doubtful constitutionality."8
V
AGENCY PRACTICE

It is difficult to generalize about the impact of changes in agency
policies on religious matching. Although the best index would be
numerical data showing a relaxing of religious barriers, few agencies
keep such information or make a practice of abstracting that which
they have. Some states relegate responsibilities for placement to counties or private institutions that are subject only to general published
guidelines and law. Although placement policies vary from state to
state, the attitudes of agency personnel interpreting agency policy
appear to concentrate more heavily on secular definitions of the best
interests of the child.87 Thus, within allowable statutory bounds, many
agencies have come to disfavor and deemphasize formalistic matching
requirements.8 8 This is evident in states where agencies encourage
86 See note 145 infra.

87 Our standard for adoptive applicants regarding religion is "the applicants
should be in agreement on the importance and means by which the child's moral,
ethical and spiritual or religious needs will be met and should indicate the manner in which these convictions will be integrated into the education and development of the child" . . . .Further, "neither church membership nor atten-

dance is required. As a public agency, we do not discriminate against adoptive
applicants on the basis of their religious belief or non-belief. If the applicants
are of different faiths, have they resolved their religions differences and decided
how their child will be reared? Is the plan realistic? How comfortable are they
about the difference?" .....

The child does not inherit religion, he acquires it.
Letter from Ruth C. Weidell, Supervisor of the Adoption Unit, Minnesota Dep't of
Public Welfare, to the Cornell Law Review, Nov. 13, 1970 (quoting regulations). The
Minnesota agency manages to maintain its relatively enlightened stance despite a
matching provision in the state's juvenile court act. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.181(3) (1971).
But see In re Kure, 197 Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936) (agency could only withhold
consent to adopt on religious grounds when to do so would not be inimical to the child's
best interests).
88 A child care administrator in a state with strict matching requirements cannot
help but feel the tension between the secular considerations relevant to placement for
adoption and the undifferentiated thrust of a protection law. One Louisiana official
wrote: "I suppose the question could be raised whether a public agency should be enforcing a provision of this kind, but I think we are conforming with the predominant
belief in the State. As you know, this is the 'Bible Belt.'" Letter from Charles 0. Yost,
supra note 47. A similar view was expressed by a Wisconsin official:
[F]rom time to time we have considered whether we should introduce legislation
to delete any reference to religion of the parents. However in actuality we do not
believe we are barred from making plans for children, and any efforts to amend
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natural parents to sign religious waivers§9 or where agencies give
expansive interpretations to "when practicable" clauses of protective
statutes.9 0
At the same time it is evident that agencies are not hesitant to
add religious content to child-parent matching provisions when it has

not been supplied by the legislature. Almost all agencies in states with
or without matching laws will give some effect to maternal wishes. 91
Others may look to religious affiliation as an index of moral or ethical
character in adoptive parents92 or may at least require religiously unaffiliated applicants to produce additional evidence of good character,
ethical uprightness, or good standing in the community. 93 Agencies
may prefer religion over nonreligion in adoptive parents, pursuant to
the rationale that some religious training is desirable for a child,94 or
they may give preferential treatment to parents matching the child's
religion by routinely considering such applicants first. 95 Thus, although
the legislation could result in public reaction which could lead to further restriction rather than to further liberalization.
Letter from Frank Newgent, supra note 48.
89 As a basic minimum, almost all states, even those without religious protection
provisions in their law, will make some effort to respect the wish of a biological parent
as to the future religious upbringing of the child. Survey, Adoption Agencies. Most
agencies, when the law allows, encourage the mother to sign a religious waiver, and in
most instances waivers are obtained. Id.
90 In New Hampshire the "when practicable" clause uses the language "same religious belief." N.H. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 169:19 (1964). The agency considers this "a most
lenient limitation, e.g., there are Catholics whose 'belief' is more Protestant than Catholic,
etc." Letter from Arthur Roberge, supra note 17.
91 See note 89 supra.
92 Many states, such as New York, routinely require some sort of clerical character
reference as part of the application process. New York Dep't of Social Welfare, Form
CW-299 (April 1966). But in New Hampshire, "evidence of regular church attendance
is not prima facie evidence that desirable moral attributes will be acquired [by the child].
Our responsibility ... is more far reaching than religion." Letter from Arthur Roberge,
supra note 17.
93 We have placed children for adoption in homes where the parents are not
members of any organized religion, but do meet moral and other qualifications.
In these cases a more in depth study is made to be certain that the child will
receive spiritual values from [his] adoptive parents.
Letter from Proctor N. Carter, State Welfare Director, Missouri Dep't of Public Health
and Welfare, to the Cornell Law Review, Nov. 5, 1970.
94 Illinois licensing regulations for adoptive or foster homes stipulate that "'[t]he
adoptive parents shall have an appreciation of spiritual values, with indication of ability
to relate them to the adoptive child through an active religious affiliation or otherwise.'"
Quoted in Letter from Elaine J. Schwartz, Social Service Specialist for the Division of
Child Welfare, Illinois Dep't of Children and Family Services, to the Cornell Law Review, Dec. 7, 1970.
95 Many agencies will not permit their matching policy to delay placement of a
child, but as a routine matter will determine whether a family of the preferred faith is
available before turning to other couples. Survey, Adoption Agencies.
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North Carolina has no protection statute and administers its agencies
on the county level, its state-wide administrative regulations provide
that "[a]gencies will usually attempt to place a child with adoptive
parents of the same religious faith as that of the child's natural parents,
or of the faith preferred by the natural parents if they have stated a
preference."9 6 Kansas agencies followed a similar practice until 1968,
when matching was abandoned except in circumstances where the
child was old enough to have embraced a religion and where it ap97
peared that his faith was important to him.
Some state agencies consider controlling statutes self-explanatory
and also accept them as agency guidelines. 98 Agency personnel in
Indiana, for example, feel no need to moderate the state's statutory
formula since the religious homogeneity of the state supposedly avoids
the creation of hardships. 99
A state agency may ostensibly mitigate the impact of religious
restrictions by soliciting religious waivers from natural parents, but
this in no way forecloses the possibility of a continued policy of de
facto matching. Other tactics are more clearly attempts to soften the
impact of religious restrictions. Minnesota has a religious matching
requirement in its juvenile court act, yet the administering agency
requires neither church membership nor attendance but merely asks
that religious differences within mixed marriages be resolved to the
extent of deciding upon the religious training of the child. 100 Moreover,
We do not have a "matching procedure" per se: however, if homes are available
we do try to place children with two parent families of the same race and religion [as] the child . . . . [I]f such homes are not available we place children
in the home that will best serve those children ....
Letter from Elaine J. Schwartz, supra note 94 (emphasis added). Although agency
policy in Virginia is not found in law or regulations, "[i]t is the general philosophy of
those involved in the field of adoption in our state that applicants must provide the
child with some basis for religion." Letter from Doris D. Falconer, Assistant Chief of
the Bureau of Family and Children's Services, Virginia Dep't of Welfare and Institutions,
to the Cornell Law Review, Dec. 1, 1970.
96 1 North Carolina Dep't of Social Services, supra note 15, § II(E)(3)(c), at 19.
97 Letter from Dorothy W. Bradley, Director of the Division of Child Welfare Services, Kansas Dep't of Social Welfare, to the Cornell Law Review, Nov. 10, 1970.
98 Maine law empowers the agency to place the child in a family according to its best
interests unless the biological parents, in writing, request religious matching, or, when
such a request has been made, if a family of the requested faith cannot be found. ME.
Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3795 (Supp. 1970). The agency believes this formula is sufficiently clear so as not to require interpretive regulations. Letter from Dorothy B. Larrabee, Foster Care and Adoption Consultant for the Division of Child and Family Services,
Maine Dep't of Health and Welfare, to the Cornell Law Review, Nov. 10, 1970.
99 Survey, Adoption Agencies.
100 Note 87 supra.
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[i]f a natural mother placed importance on having her child
adopted by parents of the same religion.., the child-placing agency
will make a reasonable effort to locate such a home. [But] the
natural mother is advised that this cannot be guaranteed. If the
mother objects to a specific denomination or religion a similar effort
is made to honor her request. Agencies do not wish to delay
adoptive placement too long so will place the child across religious
lines if necessary. 01
It is clear, however, that statutory matching requirements have
a decided effect on placement practices even where agency attitudes
are liberal. Thus, a Wisconsin administrator who expressed only slight
discomfort over the policies inherent in the protective statute was
nevertheless bound by a set of the most detailed administrative regulations on the subject of matching. 10 2 Wisconsin Department of Health
and Social Services regulations dictate a mandatory interpretation of
the statutory "when practicable" clause. 103 After a four-week search
throughout the state for a home of the proper faith, higher administrative approval must be obtained before a search for parents of another
faith may be conducted. 10 4 The department is no doubt hard pressed
at times to achieve its stated purpose that "every child legally free for
adoption, and able to develop in a family home, should be placed as
early as possible."' 105
Significant differences in approach to the religious issue occur in
states with decentralized systems of placement' 06 or with systems that
101 Letter from Ruth C. Weidell, supra note 87.
102 Note 88 supra.

A child should not be denied an adoptive home if a suitable home of his own
faith cannot be found, when a suitable home with parents of another faith is
available.
103

1)*.'. [F]irst consideration will be given to applicants of the [same] religious
faith ....
2) If a suitable home ...

of his own faith is not available ...

there should

be circularization to find such a home elsewhere in the state ....
2 Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Services, CY Manual, ch. XXI, §§ 3561.20-.22,
at 1-2 (Nov. 1968). Four pages of single-spaced regulations alone are devoted to prescribing
limits on cross-religious placement.
104 Id. § 3561.22, at 2. These regulations go further than any court decision in
defining the mandatory interpretation of "when practicable" by providing the added
dimension of time. Agencies in other states, without the aid of detailed regulations,
probably apply their own rule-of-thumb waiting period-e.g., 90 days in Illinois. Letter
from Elaine J. Schwartz, supra note 94.
105 Letter from Frank Newgent, supra note 48.
106 North Carolina publishes a lengthy welfare programs manual, but the operative
mechanisms of the adoption process exist entirely on the county level:
We have 100 counties-which, in effect, means that we have 100 public child
welfare agencies which offer adoption services.
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rely heavily on private placement agencies. 10 7 When placement is
initially with a private, sectarian child care institution, the subsequent
placement for adoption will, absent exceptional circumstances, follow
religious lines. 108 Since agency practice within the state is permitted to
vary, the state seems to have little interest in imposing uniform religious restrictions on placement. 10 9 The interests of adoptive parents
and the children themselves should be identified and weighed in the
balance against such an uncertain governmental commitment." 0
The variety of treatments given the religious issue not only makes
the law confusing to the would-be petitioner, but invites the interjection of personal religious biases by administering officials into determinations made at any of the levels of child care administration where
the issue might appear."' Even agencies that profess no strong policy
in Although our agencies operate within the broad policy framework described
in [th] manual material, they are free to establish local policies which are not inconsistent with acceptable adoption practice.
Letter from Joan C. Holland, Supervisor of Adoptions for the Family and Children's
Services Section, North Carolina Dep't of Social Services, to the Cornell Law Review,
Nov. 23, 1970. North Carolina's regulations assume that matching will "normally"
occur. Yet the Department of Social Services is cognizant of counties where matching
practices are even more rigorous than those prescribed in its regulations. Id.
107 In Kansas the state places children whom private agencies might be unwilling or
unable to place or care for over extended periods of time. Letter from Dorothy W.
Bradley, supra note 97. Although Kansas has officially abandoned matching requirements in public placements, the limited scope of public agency activity reduces the
significance of the recent change in policy. The state exercises no control over the
religious matching policies of private agencies and expects that those policies will differ
from its own. The majority of children placed for adoption are handled by licensed private
agencies: one Lutheran, two Catholic, and one bearing no sectarian label. Id. Hence,
Kansas probably has a signficant religious input into its adoption process in the pre-judicial
stages, despite the silence of its statute on religion and the liberalness of its public
administrative policy. Indeed, Kansas probably differs little in terms of practical outcome from states with religious matching statutes.
108 Religious agencies operate almost exclusively to serve their sectarian group.
Survey, Adoption Agencies. A 1963 survey of 96 Catholic agencies found that such agencies
not only refused to place children with non-Catholics, but also excluded those Catholics
who were divorced, nonpracticing, or married to non-Catholics. R. IsAAC, supra note 35,
at xv-xvi. Thus, even in the absence of a protection statute, adoptive placements will
take on a religious coloration to the extent that private agencies are made up of sectarian
groups.
109 Indeed, the very existence of sectarian agencies may indicate that religious
interests are being safeguarded and that the state therefore need not be concerned with
the minority of natural parents who express strong religious preferences at the time they
give up custody of the child to a public agency.
110 The harmful effects of matching laws on children and adoptive parents are
discussed in Section VI infra.
11 Although this is not generally a matter of blatant religious discrimination,
judges have gone to extremes in ascribing religious policies to matching laws. See, e.g.,
Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942).
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on matching have encountered such biases in their social workers

or have found it difficult to deal with applicants of certain minority
3s
religions, such as Jehovah's Witnesses or Christian Scientists.
Where the state law is clear but harsh on the question of religion,
the result is a distinct subordination of the temporal needs of children and adoptive parents, based on a policy that favors organized
religion and the supposed wishes of biological parents." 4 Where state
law is unclear, unevenly applied, or even silent, the state's power,
which provides the legal framework for adoption, is in danger of being
used as a vehicle to give effect to the personal or institutional religious
biases that exist at all levels of administration. The object of state
law on the religious question should be to identify carefully the
various interests, religious and temporal, that are relevant to the
administration of a child placement program; to enunciate clearly,
within the limits permitted by the Constitution, a state policy on how
those religious interests bearing a reasonable relation to public needs
should be protected; and to ensure a uniform and disinterested implementation of those policies at all levels of government.
VI
CONSEQUENCES OF RELIGIOUS PROTECTION STATUTES
Most religious protection laws, as currently drafted, emphasize

the supposed religious interests of the biological parents" 5 to the
detriment of both the child and the adoptive parents. The harmful
consequences of religious requirements are numerous.
Since satisfaction of the child's need for suitable parents should
be the primary goal of adoption, it is ironic that the child may suffer
most. The imposition of any requirement that excludes a number of
people from the pool of available adoptive parents, as does religious
112 See note 129 infra.

113 Oregon regulations prohibit adoption by the devout Christian Scientist. Jehovah's
Witnesses are, as a practical matter, excluded because "some of their beliefs which set
them apart from the community make it difficult to work with these people." Letter
from Raymond W. Riese, Director of the Special Child Care Services Section, Oregon
Public Welfare Division, to the Cornell Law Review, Nov. 16, 1970. Some states make
special provision for the Christian Scientist in adoption or custody laws. E.g., Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.82(3) (1957): "No person shall be denied the benefits of this chapter because
of a religious belief in the use of spiritual means of prayer for healing."
114 Section VI infra.
115 Cf. Asch, A Critical Appraisal of Adoption in New York State, 20 BaooaryK L.

Rxv. 27, 33 (1954).
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matching, can result in increasing the risk of delay."n The medical
profession agrees that early placement of infants is especially important because
[t]he adopting parents have the opportunity of caring for the infant
during the state of infantile helplessness, an arrangement which
simulates ... the natural family experience.
Early placement also avoids the danger of exposing an infant
to possible inadequate mothering. Observations and studies demto maternal deprivaonstrate clearly that infants are susceptible
tion from the earliest months of life. 1 17
Limiting the number of families eligible to adopt may mean that a
child is not placed 118 or that its ultimate placement is not in the best
possible home."19 Placement in a sectarian institution is certainly far
110 As recently as 1965, it could still be said that
in actual practice, state laws, and in the absence of laws state administrative
regulations for the licensing of agencies, ensure that in most states religious lines
will not be crossed, even when it means that placement will be delayed or the
child placed in a less suitable home.
R. IsAAC, supra note 35, at 218.
The 1970 Cornell Law Review survey indicates that many agencies are now unwilling
to delay placement in order to match religions. Survey, Adoption Agencies. One agency,
for example, reported:
In the past we placed children of Protestant families with Protestant adoptive
parents, children of Catholic families with Catholic adoptive parents, and children
of Jewish families with Jewish adoptive parents. When we were operating in that
way we occasionally had difficulty placing a Catholic child because we had few
Catholic adoptive applicants. Consequently we modified this plan ....
Letter from Dorothy W. Bradley, supra note 97. In Minnesota, "[a]gendes do not wish to
delay adoptive placement too long so will place the child across religious lines if necessary." Letter from Ruth C. Weidell, supra note 87.
Delays in placement, however, have not been entirely eliminated. In Louisiana, for
example, "[t]here are some delays because of the religious requirements. This is just one
other factor which makes matching difficult." Letter from Charles 0. Yost, supra note 47.
In Wisconsin, a delay factor is built into the adoption procedure. If a matching family
is not available in the area, the agency must make an inquiry first to other districts, allowing two weeks for responses, and then inquire through the Resource Exchange, allowing an additional two weeks for responses. 2 Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Services, supra note 103, § 3561.22, at 2.
11T AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRIcs, ADOPTION OF CHILMREN 12 (2d ed. 1967). See
Bowlby, Substitute Families. Adoption, in R-ADINGS IN ADOPTION, supra note 11, at 434,
435. In view of the advantages of early placement, one agency conducted an experiment
by making several placements of infants directly from the hospital with successful results.
See Lynch & Mertz, Adoptive Placement of Infants Directly from the Hospital,in READINGS
Is ADOPTION, supra note 11, at 188.
118 The administrative regulations of North Carolina explicitly recognize, however,

that "it is not in the best interest of a child to allow requirements for religious matching
... perhaps to deny him altogether of the opportunity for adoption." 1 North Carolina
Dep't of Social Services, supra note 15, § II(E)(3)(c), at 19. But see text accompanying
note 96 supra.
119 List, A Child and a Wall: A Study of "Religious Protection" Laws, 13 BuFFALO
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inferior to placement in any suitable home, yet this may be the result
of religious requirements.120 Even after custody of a child has been
given to a would-be parent, a petition for adoption may be denied on
religious grounds. This has occurred even in cases where the child
had been in petitioners' custody for many years and strong parentchild attachments had developed . 21 Denial of a petition in these circumstances destroys a beneficial on-going relationship, 22 severs the
emotional ties between parents and child, and forces the child to
undergo the trauma of readjusting to a new home or institutional
setting, possibly hampering his normal psychological development. 2 3
Even if a long-standing relationship is not involved, multiple place24
ments may jeopardize a child's emotional development.
People who wish to adopt a child are also disadvantaged by reliL. REv. 9, 34-36 (1963). There are many social and psychological factors involved in determining which parents and children are most suited to each other: "Mandatory religious requirements ignore the basic premise that each placement problem is unique."
Note, Constitutionality of Mandatory Religious Requirements in Child Care, 64 YALE
L.J. 772, 777 (1955) (footnote omitted).
120 In some jurisdictions, matching placement is deemed practicable if there are
numerous families available of the same religious faith who would hypothetically be
willing to adopt the child, or if there is a sectarian agency that services children of that
faith. This interpretation may be required by statute or judicial precedent. E.g., LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13:1581 (1968); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 116(e) (McKinney 1963); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 252 (1965); notes 36-38 supra.
121 See, e.g., Ellis v. McCoy, 332 Mass. 254, 257, 124 N.E.2d 266, 267 (1955), where the
adoption was denied even though, as the court conceded, "[t]he child is happy with
[the adoptive parents] and they have grown to love her." See also In re Goldman, 331
Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955); In re Santos, 278 App.
Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Ist Dep't 1951); In re Anonymous, 195 Misc. 6, 88 N.Y.S.2d 829
(Sur. Ct. 1949).
A study of adoption in New York revealed that sympathetic court personnel sometimes
advise adoptive parents to delay for several years the filing of a petition since "[t]his
gives the court an excuse for ultimately granting the adoption." Asch, supra note 115, at
55. In light of past decisions, however, the danger of this practice is evident.
122 In In re Stone, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 730, 738 (County Ct. 1960), the court expressed
concern lest it "wipe out a relationship of more than two years standing . .. ."
123 Take the case of Frances, a gay, talkative five-year-old until she was snatched
from the only home she had known and sent to live with strangers, her new
parents. Frances became hysterical, stopped eating, and started to wet her bed.
Her intelligence, rated as bright-normal, dropped to low-average. Time was no
healer, for three years later a psychiatrist reported: "This child is still depressed
and so badly traumatized that we cannot predict her future."
Lake, Must Babies Wear Religious Tags?, GoOD HOUSEKEEPING, Nov. 1970, at 79, 218. Cf.
Wires, Placement for Adoption-A Total Separation?, in READINGS IN ADOpTON, supra
note 11, at 144. But see Fitzsimmons v. Liuni, 51 Misc. 2d 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Family
Ct. 1966).
PEDIATRICs, supra note 117, at 9-10. Some courts have
124 AMERICAN ACADEMY o
explicitly recognized this factor: "It is highly detrimental to the welfare of small children
to shift them around from one family to another." State ex rel. Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo.
569, 586, 162 S.W. 119, 124 (1913).
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gious requirements. Adoptive parents suffer if they are separated from
a child with whom they have strong emotional ties. 125 The consequences, however, extend further back than the actual adoption
proceedings. Religious requirements may discourage some suitable
adoptive parents from seeking to adopt a child.128 More important, a
large number of adoptive parents are denied custody in the first
instance. This reservoir of would-be parents constitutes a loose category of individuals with no appreciable representation or influence
in the political decision-making process, in sharp contrast to organized
religions that are able to exert effective political pressures to further
27
their interests.1
125 In one widely-publicized case, Ellis v. McCoy, 332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266
(1955), the adoptive parents were so attached to the child that, refusing to give her up,
they fled to Florida. Florida denied a Massachusetts request to extradite the adoptive
parents on kidnapping charges, and eventually the child was adopted under Florida law.
R. IsAAC, supra note 35, at 219-20.
126 The law may therefore have a deterrent effect before it raises a formal bar to
adoption. For example, a couple with mixed religious backgrounds who would like to
adopt may wonder if the state will pry into their religious differences or, worse yet, if the
state will place a child with them only to take it away later when their religious diversity
is revealed. Their fears are not altogether unfounded. Even though an agency might accept a nominal religious affiliation (and thus place a child with them), the judge might
have different notions. This is revealed by the survey of New York family court judges.
First, asked how often they inquired about the religious affiliations of the adoptive parents,
21 judges replied always, one occasionally, and two never. Further, when asked how often
they inquired whether the adoptive parents are church members, 12 judges replied
always, five generally, one occasionally, and only seven replied never. Finally, when asked
how often they inquired about the regularity of church attendance by the adoptive
parents, nine replied always, five generally, three occasionally, and seven never. Survey,
Judges.
Moreover, a couple of mixed religious background will, when compared with a group
with unmixed religious affiliations, probably get the coolest reception from their caseworker, notwithstanding the liberalness of state law on the issue of religion. In a 1959
experiment conducted by the Child Welfare League, 184 social workers from 13 states
conducted hour-long interviews with five couples. The couple that consistently ranked
the lowest was the only one in which religions were mixed, even though other couples
had demonstrated psychological problems which caused the workers to comment. R.
IsAAC, supra note 35, at 30-32.
127 "[T]he pressures exerted by religious interest groups even where the laws leave
some freedom of action, are becoming ever more severe ...." R. ISAAc, supra note 35, at
218. Religious pressure groups sometimes attempt to exert their influence not only by
lobbying for laws favorable to their interests but also by intervening in particular cases.
Some courts have taken a dim view of such intervention. In Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 IMI.
2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957), the Supreme Court of Illinois declared that it was improper
to allow Catholic Charities to intervene in an adoption case, since the institution had no
enforceable or recoguizable legal right to the children, but only a general interest in the
proceedings. Similarly, in Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 196, 80 N.E. 802 (1907),
the lower court declared: "j1]f members of [the] church have taken an interest in this
case as sectarians and promotors of the interests of their church, they have no proper place
before the court, and will receive no recognition there."
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In the adoption process, ideally all potential parents should be
"assured complete equity with others seeking children."'12 In practice, however, those of minority religious backgrounds often encounter
serious obstacles in attempting to adopt a child. 129 Those who are,, in
effect, precluded from adopting through an authorized agency on religious grounds are faced with three options. The first is to give up the
idea of adoption. 130 This alternative deprives would-be parents of the
family they desire and the equitable treatment they deserve. Moreover,
needy children are also deprived of homes that would otherwise be
available to them. 131
The adoptive parents, moreover, are exclusively concerned with providing homes for
needy children whereas the sectarian agency often mixes its concern for the child's welfare
with its own evangelical predispositions. See Reid, Principles, Values, and Assumptions
Underlying Adoption Practice, in READINGS IN ADOPTION, supra note 11, at 26, 29.
128 NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF LAwYERS

AND

SOCIAL WoRKERs,

REsPONSIBILrrIEs

AND

4 (1965).
129 This, of course, includes people who are members of no religion as well as those
who are members of minority faiths:
The couple who is not affiliated with a church ... may have to abandon hope of
adopting through an agency.
... Jews and others of minority faiths find the supply of children of their
faith so low that private adoption is often the only alternative.
R. IsAAc, supra note 55, at 13. Recently, one Jewish couple, after being rejected by several
agencies, was finally able to obtain a child through private sources for a fee of $6,000.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1970, at 35, col. 2. Caseworker biases may further exacerbate the
situation. In Minnesota, for example, agencies "have encountered worker biases when
placing children into certain denominational homes such as Christian Science, Jehovah's
Witnesses and avowed atheists. With time and repeated effort [they] have been able to
make placements in these homes." Letter from Ruth C. Weidell, supra note 87. In North
Carolina, "one of [the] counties once hesitated to place an Anglo-Protestant infant with
a Mohammedan couple from Iran but finally did so-they have . . . been excellent
parents." Letter from Joan C. Holland, supra note 106. See also T. BRADLEY, AN EXPLORECIPROCAL RELATIONS IN ADOPTIoN-LAwYER

AND SOCIAL WORER

RATION OF CAsEWORKERS' PERCEPTIONS OF ADOPTIVE APPLICANTS

167 (1966).

Couples who are not only members of a dominant faith but who also actively practice that faith occupy a preferred position among applicants. See R. IsAAc, supra note 35,
at 12. This is indicated by the extent to which judges inquire about the church affiliations
and activities of adoptive parents. Note 126 supra. One writer therefore advises would-be
adoptive parents to join a church,

perhaps even joining the young married group of the church to make themselves
more visible in less time to the minister and other congregants. Where there is a

mixed marriage and one member has been intending for years to join the faith

of the other, he or she might take the plunge.
R. IsAAc, supra note 35, at 12.
130 See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
131 This, of course, depends on the number of children available for adoption compared with the number of adults who want to adopt, which varies from time to time.
Since the present demand for normal, white babies exceeds the supply, these children may
not be disadvantaged now; however, handicapped, older, and racial minority children are
still hard to place. Note 47 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, the situation may
change in the future, and, if it does, the first group of children may again be disadvantaged
in finding adoptive homes.
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Second, adoptive parents may misrepresent their religious affiliation in order to qualify; 1 32 in fact, they may even be encouraged to do
so. 33 Encouraging people to compromise their integrity brings the law
into disrespect. This alternative further places adoptive parents in
continual jeopardy of being discovered in their deception, 3 4 even
after they have custody. It also has the anomalous effect of making
those who are less honest more eligible to adopt.
Third, couples may abandon attempts to adopt through an authorized agency and turn to independent sources. The authorized
agency, "composed of social workers, doctors and lawyers, with help
' 5
from geneticists, anthropologists, psychologists and psychiatrists,"'
has at its disposal resources unavailable in independent adoptions. The
interests of all parties are protected through examinations of the child
and investigations of the prospective home. 36 Independent placements
lack these safeguards, and therefore even where they are well-meaning
and without pecuniary consideration, 37 they are more hazardous than
placements through an authorized agency. 38 In addition, the identity
The possible consequences are illustrated by the situation in Canada only a few
years ago. In Alberta, only 304 out of 1,600 Roman Catholic children available for
adoption were in preadoptive homes, whereas 983 out of 1,150 non-Catholic children
were in such homes. R. IsAAc, supra note 35, at 218.
132 One writer includes among the options available to those with no church affiliation to "pretend to belong to a church, perhaps obtaining the reference of a sympathetic
clergyman-friend ....
R. IsAAc, supra note 35, at 13.
The agencies are not unaware of this factor. In response to the Cornell Law Review
questionnaire, one agency commented: "Many people start going to church before they
apply in order to 'qualify' but after the adoption is decreed who knows what happens?
... People become members of a religion for adoption purposes in other words." Survey,
Adoption Agencies. Nor is the judiciary unaware. In one case the judge commended the
adoptive applicant for not doing so: "He could have lied about it and the fact that he
didn't lie about it is so much in his favor." Transcript of Proceedings at 9, In re "E"
(N.J. County Ct. Nov. 2, 1970). The petition was nonetheless denied.
133 One would-be parent recalled: "'Some social workers suggested that we couldn't
want a baby all that badly or we'd certainly be willing to sacrifice our integrity. Why
didn't we just join a church and shut up about our views?'" Lake, supra note 123, at 220.
134 Id.
135 Reid, Social Service in Adoption, in THE CmLD AT LAw: REPORT OF THE TWENTYEiGHTH

Ross
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58, 59 (1958).

supra note 117, at 5-6; Note, Moppets on the
Market: The Problem of UnregulatedAdoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 718-24 (1950).
137 Although a 1950 study indicated that "black-market" adoptions were infrequent
(Note, supra note 136, at 715), more recent studies indicate that they are increasing
(O'Connell, The Adoption Muddle: A Possible Solution, 15 N.Y.L.F. 759, 766 (1969); N.Y.
Times, Dec. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 7). Independent placements in nonrelative adoptions are
now prohibited in some states. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904 (1953). See generally
Schmidt, The Community and the Adoption Problem, in READINGS IN ADOPTION, supra
note 11, at 38.
138 One study revealed that out of 100 independent placements, "only 46 were satis136 AMERICAN ACADEmY OF PEDIATRCS,
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of the parties may not be confidential in an independent placement,
thus leaving the adoptive parents vulnerable to pressure from the
biological parents. 13 9 The policy of the law, therefore, should be to
discourage independent placements, yet religious protection statutes
may have the opposite effect.
The influence of religious protection laws may continue even
after a petition is granted, when the court decrees 140 or makes it a
condition of the adoption' 4' that the child be brought up in a particular religion. Such requirements are as unwise as they are ineffectual.
Commanding parents to train the child in a religion that may be
anathema to them risks injecting a hostile element into the home; 142
even if the religion is not hateful to the parents, the disparity in religious worship is bound to result in disharmony in the family. 143 The
purpose of adoption should be to duplicate as nearly and completely
as possible the natural relationship between parent and child, and state
supervision of the child's religious training, traditionally the prerogafactory; 26 were questionable at best; and 28 were definitely undesirable." Out of 100
agency placements, 76 were satisfactory, 16 were questionable, and eight were undesirable.
Note, supra note 136, at 724 n.43.
139 Id. at 724.
140 See, e.g., In re Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 289 N.Y.S. 355 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936);
Commonwealth ex rel. Stack v. Stack, 141 Pa. Super. 147, 15 A.2d 76 (1940). Some courts
have gone to the length of appointing a co-guardian to supervise the child's religious
training. See, e.g., People ex rel. Rich v. Lackey, 139 Misc. 42, 248 N.Y.S. 561 (Sup. Ct.
1930).
.41 See, e.g., Lemke v. Guthmann, 105 Neb. 251, 181 N.W. 132 (1920); In re Mancini,
89 Misc. 83, 151 N.Y.S. 387 (Sur. Ct. 1915). In State ex rel. Evangelical Lutheran Kinderfreund Soc'y v. White, 123 Minn. 508, 514, 144 N.W. 157, 159 (1913), the guardians were
prohibited from attempting "to influence the religious training of the child contrary to
the doctrines of the church of her [natural] parents .......
The supposed liberality of
certain decisions (see, e.g., the discussion of In re Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848,
176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958), in Note, The Religious Factor in New York Adoption Proceedings, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 825, 829-31 (1967)) must be seriously questioned in light of the
adoptive parents' willingness to raise the child in its "own" religion. Note 44 supra.
142 Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REV. 333, 359 (1955).
143 "To create a basic religious conflict in the mind of the child, and between it
and its custodian, would be detrimental to its welfare." Boerger v. Boerger, 26 NJ. Super.
90, 104, 97 A.2d 419, 427 (1953).
Such requirements may also operate to inhibit placement in the first instance. For
example, one couple wanted to adopt a boy of eight with a deformed arm and serious
emotional problems, a so-called "hard-to-place" child:
[T]he agency had second thoughts. The [adoptive parents] could have the boy,
they said, but only if they took him to church on Sundays. Can parents raise
three of their [own] children in the Jewish faith and one as a Christian? [This
couple] honestly felt that they could not.
Lake, supra note 123.
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tive of the parents, 144 introduces an alien element into the family
environment. 145
VII
TBE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS PROTECTION STATUTES

A. The Imputation of Religion
Although the Supreme Court has not yet confronted the issues
presented by religious protection statutes, several aspects of these laws
seem to collide with constitutional prohibitions. Before religious
matching can be effected, the relevant religion must first be determined. Most statutes provide that the relevant religion shall be that
of the child or the natural parent or parents.
This seemingly simple formula is in reality fraught with difficulties. Although it may make sense to talk about the child's own religion where the child is old enough to have received and understood
religious training, where the child is an infant or has had no such
training, courts must confront the inherent difficulties "underlying
the concept that a child too young to understand any religion, even
imperfectly, nevertheless may have a religion."' 4 No court has yet
faced up to these difficulties.
1. JudicialInterpretationof Religious Doctrine
Courts frequently give weight to dedication to a faith, such as
baptism or circumcision. 47 This judicial emphasis on ceremonial reli144 "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents ...." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
145 Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceedings,
84 N.Y.U.L. R V.649, 685, 689 (1959).

[It is basically totalitarian and repugnant to a free democratic people that the
internal life of a family should be subject to state control and state supervision.
A free family in a free society should not be required to adopt a state-appointed
Big Brother. When the purpose... is to control religious upbringing, it is doubly

repugnant to our traditions, for it violates not only the sanctity and integrity
of the family but also the independence of church and state.
Pfeffer, supra note 142.
146 In re Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 652, 121 N.E.2d 848, 846 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 942 (1955). In In re Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 592, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14 (Dom. Rel. Ct.

1953), the court recognized this problem:
Parenthetically, sometimes I question whether a child under the age of four or

six or seven has a distinctive religious faith or has any particular religious persuasion. Children who are non sui juris, or who have not as yet reached the age

of reason, cannot be converted from one religion to another.... Conversion ...
is accomplished by the parents.
147 See, e.g., In re Santos, 278 App. Div. 378, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1951). In
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gious rites has been criticized as an improper civil acceptance of
148
ecclesiastical authority.
Moreover, where a child has been dedicated to more than one
faith, the courts may be faced with difficult religious doctrinal questions. For example, in In re Glavas,149 the court was asked to determine
the religion of a four-year-old boy whose mother was Jewish and whose
father was Greek Catholic. Shortly after his birth, and with the father's
consent, the child was circumcised in accordance with rules prescribed
by the Jewish religion. 150 Four years later, without the mother's
knowledge or consent, the father had the boy baptized by a Roman
Catholic priest. 151 The court found it significant "that the father [was]
not a Roman Catholic" and questioned his good faith. 52 It concluded
that "the baptism [did] not supersede the circumcision" and the consent of both parents was necessary to effectuate a change in the child's
religion. 153 Because the number of marriages in the United States beIn re Israel, 24 Misc. 2d 1089, 206 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1960), the court's conclusion that no finding could be made as to the religions of the three children-aged three,
two, and almost one year-despite both biological parents' averments that the children
were Jewish, was in part based on the fact that "the children have neither been baptized
nor formally admitted into any faith." Id. at 1090, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 468. Of course, not all
decisions attach such great weight to dedication:
A custom has grown up that where a child is once baptized or entered in
any prescribed manner into a church, that the child is to be treated as belonging
to that church so long as he is a minor. There is no foundation in law for such
a position.
In re Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 15, 289 N.Y.S. 355, 359 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936).
Nevertheless, the Cornell Law Review survey of judicial practice in New York reveals
that for many judges dedication is a significant factor in adoption proceedings. When
asked how often they inquire as to whether the infant has been dedicated to a faith by
a ritual such as baptism, 16 of the judges said they always asked, three said generally,
two said occasionally, and only four said never. Survey, Judges. The judges were also
given a hypothetical situation in which the mother is a member of a major religion and
the adoptive parents are of a different faith and intend to raise the child in their faith;
the child has been dedicated to the faith of the mother by a ritual such as baptism. Two
of the judges would automatically bar such an adoption; eight of the judges reported
that their reaction would be extremely unfavorable, eight were unfavorable, and four
were only slightly unfavorable. Only five stated that they would give the dedication
factor no effect. Id. See also Broeder & Barrett, supra note 35, at 654.
148 Ramsey, supra note 145, at 672.

149 203 Misc. 590, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953).
150 Id. at 593, 121 N.Y.S2d at 15.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 594, 121 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
153 Id. at 597, 121 N.Y.S.2d at 19. One can only speculate whether the decision would

have been different if the father had been Roman Catholic; or if the court had been impressed with the father's sincerity; or if the mother had known about the baptism and
had neither consented nor objected; or if the father had been unaware of the religious
implications of the circumcision. Since Jewish law holds that any child born of a Jewish
mother is a Jew (Cf. Rubenstein, Law and Religion in Israel, 2 IsRAEL L. Rr.v. 380,
413 (1967)), the court might have held the child to be a Jew even without circumcision.
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tween persons of different religious faiths is substantial and increasing,.54 it is likely that more cases involving multiple dedications will
arise.155
Even if civil courts may properly accept the determinations of
ecclesiastical authorities, the problem is not solved where the religious
dogma of such authorities conflict. When the court is unable to rely
on parental consent, as it did in Glavas, the difficulty appears to be
insurmountable. The Supreme Court has held that the first amendment prohibits civil courts from entertaining litigation that "is made
to turn on the resolution ... of controversies over religious doctrine
and practice."'15 Determination of a child's religion based on dedication to a faith is nothing less than adjudication "over religious doctrine
and practice." Moreover, the courts may not avoid this difficulty by
ignoring ecclesiastical doctrine and attempting to decide which religion will best promote the child's welfare, for "the State . . . cannot,
under our present Constitution, undertake to decide what form of
15
religious instruction is best for any person.PY 7
Similar difficulties are involved where determination of the child's
154

NEWsw=, March 1, 1971, at 57.

155 A similarly complex situation was presented to the court in In re Vardinakis,
160 Misc. 13, 289 N.Y.S. 355 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936). There, a Catholic mother and a Moslem
father, married in the Protestant church, had four children. The first child, a son, was
baptized Catholic, against the father's wishes; the second and third were Mohammedan
against the mother's wishes; and the court determined that the fourth child had no
religion, although the father claimed the child to be Mohammedan. The court ordered
the oldest son placed with his Moslem uncle, with the mother's consent. The other three
children were placed in a Protestant foster home; the oldest girl was permitted to go to
church with her mother and the other two were permitted to go to Moslem services with
their father.
150 Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). Previously, the Court had held:
[Wjhenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which
the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as
final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871). This approach is admittedly better
than allowing a civil court to decide matters of religious doctrine, thus possibly overriding ecclesiastical authority on an interpretation of parochial dogma. Nevertheless, such
civil acceptance of ecclesiastical pronouncements represents a state involvement in religious matters. The better rule is to prohibit state involvement in ecclesiastical matters entirely. For a discussion of state intervention in ecclesiastical disputes, see L. PFFER,
CMMCH STATE AND FREEDOM 287-302 (rev. ed. 1967).
157 State ex rel. Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 585, 162 S.W. 119, 124 (1913); accord,
Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 196, 80 N.E. 802 (1907) (quoting lower court decision):
"The Roman Catholic church and the Baptist church are both alike before
the law. The court does not hold that the interests of a child will be promoted
by education in either of these churches in preference to the other."
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religion is based on that of its natural parent or parents.1 8 The parent's religion must be ascertained at the time the child was relinquished or at the time of the adoption. 159 If the parents are only
nominal members of a faith and do not actively practice their religion,
or if their conduct arguably demonstrates an abandonment of that
religion, a determination of parental religion necessitates court involvement with the same doctrinal questions forbidden civil jurisdiction by
the first amendment.8 0 For example, in In re Goldman,""'the Jewish
adoptive parents argued that the natural mother had abandoned
Roman Catholicism by committing adultery, obtaining a civil divorce
(both mortal sins under Church doctrine), failing to baptize her children, and placing the children with Jewish parents, knowing that
they would be raised in the Jewish faith. 16 2 The court rejected the
argument:
The mother did not cease to be a Catholic, even if she failed to
live up to the ideals of her religion. If that were the test of
belonging to a religious faith it is feared that few could qualify for
any faith.163
The claim was not that the mother failed to live up to the ideals of
her faith, however; it was that she had, by her conduct, demonstrated
an abandonment of that faith. The court's failure to examine the
issue more deeply is not surprising, for the issue is one of religious
doctrine and not civil law. Judicial reliance on formal expulsion from
a faith, such as excommunication, is not a satisfactory solution either.
Many sects make no formal provision for expulsion, and, even where
such provision is made, reliance would involve improper obeisance
by civil to religious authority.
2. Establishment of Religion
Even if the courts were able to overcome the threshold difficulty
of determining the relevant religion, the practice of imputing religion
to children may violate the establishment clause of the first amendment, which is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend158 The Supreme Court has suggested by way of dictum that any state examination
of religious beliefs might infringe upon first amendment rights: "[A] state-conducted inquiry into the sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs [is] a practice which a State
might believe would itself run afoul of the spirit of constitutionally protected religious
guarantees." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (footnote omitted).
159 Pfeffer, supra note 142, at 382.
160 See note 156 and accompanying text supra.
161 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
162 Pfeffer, supra note 142, at 382-84.
163 331 Mass. at 649, 121 N.E.2d at 844.
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ment.164 Although the boundaries of the establishment clause have
not yet been dearly defined, the Supreme Court has ruled that the
clause must be given a "broad interpretation."' 1 5 With this admonition
in mind, the imputation of religion must be measured against the two
principal tests that have emerged from recent Supreme Court establishment decisions.
The first test, based on a no-aid principle, requires that government be neutral as regards religion; while the state may not be hostile,
neither may it actively support religion. The test was thus formulated
in the leading case, Everson v. Board of Education:66 "Neither [a
state nor the federal government] can pass laws which aid one religion,
167
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."'
Where religion is imputed to a child in the absence of a parental request or contrary to such a request, the state cannot claim to
be effectuating any parental right theory. The imposition of a religious
status on a child in such circumstances, 16 8 wholly on the initiative of
the state, prefers religion over nonreligion and constitutes a substantial aid to religion. 169 Moreover, judicial reliance on such religious
dedication rites as baptism and circumcision supports those religions
in which such rites are determinative of religious faith over those in
which they are not. 70 Imputation based on dedication therefore favors
some religions over others in contravention of the first amendment.
The second principal test is a dual one which requires that "to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
164 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947).
165 Id. at 15.

166 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
167 Id. at 15.
168 Decisions sometimes refer to the religious "status" of a child (e.g., In re Mancini,
89 Misc. 83, 85, 151 N.Y.S. 387, 388 (Sur. Ct. 1915)) or hold that the child is "entitled"

to be raised in a specific faith (e.g., Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 113 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1942); Palm v. Smith, 183 Ore. 617, 622, 195 P.2d 708, 710 (1948)).
169 Imputation based on the faith of the natural parents makes it virtually impossible for a child to avoid some religious designation, since most people have a religious
element somewhere in their backgrounds. Wisconsin regulations, for example, provide:
The religious faith of the child ...is considered to be the same as the religious
faith of the parent or parents (or the religious heritage or background if the
parent or parents are unaffiliated at the time the child is placed in the agency's
guardianship) ....

2 Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Services, supra note 103, § 3561.20, at 1 (emphasis
added).
170 This approach "obviously disadvantages adherents of those religions which suspend acceptance into membership until a time when their doctrines can be understood by
a comprehending mind." List, supra note 119, at 25. See Ramsey, supra note 145, at 672.
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nor inhibits religion."' 7' It is difficult to find any secular purpose in
state imputation of religion. 7 2 Imputation cannot be justified on the
theory that the child's spiritual welfare will best be promoted by one
religion rather than another or by any religion rather than none, for
"[t]he law does not profess to know what is a right belief."' 178 Moreover,
enhancement of spiritual well-being is hardly a secular purpose.
In order to justify imputation, the imposition of a religious status
on a child must be connected with some secular benefit. 7 4 One possible
argument along these lines is that the social status of the child could
be enhanced through imputation of certain religions-a child who is
a member of a major faith will face fewer problems in society than
will a child who is, for example, a Jehovah's Witness or an atheist. If
this is true of religion, however, it is even more true with respect to
race; whites are obviously spared many of the obstacles encountered
by blacks. Nevertheless, in In re a Minor, 75 Judge Bazelon ruled that
"the distinction between the 'social status' of whites and Negroes"
cannot be the basis for denial of an adoption. 78 The very purpose
of the first amendment is to promote tolerance among persons of
different religions and to eradicate social distinctions based on religion, while maintaining within the country the independence and
vitality of a multiplicity of religious faiths. 77 To impute religion on
the theory that one faith is better socially than another or than none
is to violate the spirit of the first amendment by emphasizing these
171 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); accord, Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
172 Although the dual tests under the establishment clause are analytically distinguishable, they do overlap. Thus, although the following arguments are directed primarily at the first part of the test, that of secular purpose, they may be applicable to the
second part, the primary effect test, as well.
173 In re Doyle, 16 Mo. App. 159, 166 (1884). Thus, the court cannot consider "the
eternal interests of the child in a future state of existence ...." Id. at 167. See note 157
and accompanying text supra.
174 Not all legislation with religious overtones is prohibited. The crudal distinction is
between legislation which finds support in considerations of public interest, even
though also identifiable with religious views and practices, and legislation designed to force a religious view or practice upon the community. The latter
must be condemned as an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
P. KAUPEm, Civi. LmERTES AND THE CONS'rrurION 31 (1962).
175 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
176 Id. at 448.
177 Historians include among the factors underlying the first amendment the large
number of unbelievers in the colonies, the large number of denominations among the
believers, and the necessity, under these circumstances, of religious toleration. P. KuRLAND, RELUGION AND THE LAW 16-17 (1962).
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distinctions and by exacerbating the frictions the amendment was
178
designed to overcome.
A second argument is that the state, as parens patriae, must provide for the moral development of the child, and the imputation of
religion is a means of ensuring the child's proper moral upbringing.
But this position presupposes a causal relationship between religious
training and morality that has yet to be proved. In fact, the few studies
that have been made indicate no such relationship. 1 9 Even assuming
the existence of such a connection, however, the argument further
presumes that religion is a necessary criterion of morality. 180 Again,
there is no evidence to support this view. In many cases where adop178 Moreover, as the court recognized in State ex rel. Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569,
585, 162 S.W. 119, 124 (1913): "It is difficult to see how the State could be interested in
perpetuating the same religious views from one generation to another."
170 For a discussion of the connection between religious training and delinquency,
see Wattenberg, Church Attendance and Juvenile Misconduct, 34 SOCIOLOGY & SOCIAL
R SEARCH 195 (1950). W. GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEw YORK
CITY 84 (1954), refers to other research projects in this area. For a discussion of studies
made on the correlation between religious training and "good character traits," see
Broeder & Barrett, supra note 35, at 669-71. In State ex rel. Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569,
585, 162 S.W. 119, 124 (1913), the court observed:
Courts . . . should never attempt the more delicate and difficult task of determining what form of religious teaching is most likely to promote good morals or
good citizenship. In fact, they could not do so without invading the domain of
private conscience, and undermine, if not destroy, the inestimable blessings of
religious liberty.
See also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
180 One organization has a more enlightened attitude:
Opportunity for religious or spiritual and ethical development of the child should
receive full consideration in the selection of adoptive homes. Lack of religious
affiliation or of a religious faith, however, should not be a bar to consideration
of any applicants for adoption.
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE: REvSED 51 (1968)
(emphasis added).
A small minority of public agencies share this attitude. In Missouri, "[a]ll that we
require is that the child be taught spiritual values .... " Letter from Proctor N. Carter,
supra note 93. In Minnesota, according to public welfare regulations, "'neither church
membership nor attendance is required.'" The only requirement is that
"the applicants should be in agreement on the importance and means by which the
child's moral, ethical and spiritual or religious needs will be met and should
indicate the manner in which these convictions will be integrated into the education and development of the child."
Quoted in Letter from Ruth C. Weidell, supra note 87 (emphasis added). In New Hampshire
we need to be satisfied that a child will be raised so as to acquire the moral attributes necessary to live in a civil and free world. With this approach you can
readily see that evidence of regular church attendance is not prima facie evidence
that desirable moral attributes will be acquired. Our responsibility then, in terms
of morality, is more far reaching than religion.
Letter from Arthur Roberge, supra note 17.
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tion petitions were denied on religious grounds, the courts have conceded that the moral qualifications of the adoptive parents were
entirely satisfactory, indicating that the denials were not based on a
fear that the child would not receive proper moral training. 8 1
Although the moral development of a child is a secular purpose,
and religious training may be one way of promoting this purpose, it
is clearly not the only way. The same goal can be achieved by simply
providing that adoptive parents meet the state's moral qualifications.
It is well settled that the state may not use religious means to accomplish secular goals if those goals may be achieved by nonreligious
means. 8 2 In School District v. Schempp, 83 Pennsylvania attempted to
justify its requirement that the Bible be read at the beginning of each
school day on the ground that moral values were promoted, but the
Supreme Court held that such "religious exercises" nevertheless violated the first amendment. 84 In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan explained that the establishment clause forbids those involvements
of religious with secular institutions which use essentially "religious
85
means to serve secular ends where secular means would suffice."'
Absent a demonstrable temporal benefit to the child, the argument that imputation of religion is permissible because it promotes
the child's secular well-being is untenable. For, although the state may
certainly seek to foster the secular interests of the child, it may not
equate the child's temporal welfare with its alleged religious welfare
without violating the first amendment.
Another justification that has been advanced is that imputation
is permissible because it furthers freedom of religion. This is one of
181 In a recent New Jersey case, an adoption petition was denied because the
adoptive parents lacked a religious affiliation, even though the couple was highly recommended by the agency, which "found them to be people of high moral and ethical
standards." In re "E," at 3 (N.J. County Ct. Nov. 2, 1970). The judge presumably agreed
with this judgment, for at the hearing, after questioning petitioner about his ethical
beliefs, the judge commented:
I have heard some Catholics who are unable to express the Christian view as well
as you expressed it. In other words, you don't take the Christian view but basically you have a good moral life and you believe in a code of morals, sir.
Transcript of Proceedings at 7-8, In re "E" (N.J. County Ct. Nov. 2, 1970). See State
ex rel. Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 162 S.W. 119 (1913); In re Glavas, 203 Misc. 590,
121 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953).
182 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion);
cf. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (dictum) (statute imposing an indirect
burden on free exercise of religion invalid if the secular purpose can be achieved by
means that do not impose such a burden).
183 374 US. 203 (1963).
184 Id. at 223.
185 Id. at 281.
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the most enigmatic of rationales employed by the courts in adoption
cases because, no matter what the holding, the decision is invariably
justified on the grounds of religious freedom. 8 6 Free exercise of religion, however, does not exist in a vacuum; the state must demonstrate
whose religious freedom it is protecting.
One possibility is that the state is protecting the child's religious
freedom; thus, some courts have held that a child is "entitled" to be
raised in a particular religion.3 7 While a child may have an ecclesiastical right to be so raised, it does not have such a civil or constitutional right. 8 8 To the contrary, it is the child's parents who have the
right to control the child's religious upbringing. 8 9 Although the
courts may respect a child's religious preference 9 where he is old
enough to have such preferences, this is not constitutionally required
but is based on other factors. For example, the court may believe that
a change in religious environment will be traumatic for the child,' 91
or that it will impede the child's adjustment to a new home, or that
implicit in the child's religious desires is a preference for one home
rather than another. 92 To couch such secular considerations in religious terms only confuses the real issue-determining the placement
that will best promote the child's secular welfare.
The state can hardly maintain that it is promoting the religious
freedom of the natural parents, for imputation of religion, by definition, is state-initiated and determined and is not designed to effectuate
parental wishes. In reality, state imputation of religion ignores parental indifference to the religious upbringing of the child and may
186 Compare In re "E" (N.J. County Ct. Nov. 2, 1970) (petition denied) with State
ex rel. Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 162 S.W. 119 (1913) (petition granted).
187 Note 168 supra.
188 Ramsey, supra note 145, at 672-73.

189 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
US. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
190 See, e.g., Boerger v. Boerger, 26 NJ. Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419 (1953); Martin v.
Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 812 (1954); Ex parte Agnello, 72 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct.
1947).
191 Even the natural parents' right to change the child's religion may be circumscribed because repeated changes may be detrimental to the child's "sense of security."
In re Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 596, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12, 18 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953). Cf. Boerger v.
Boerger, 26 N.J. Super. 90, 102, 97 A.2d 419, 426 (1953): "The Catholic training of the
children never progressed so far that definite religious ideas were impressed upon their
minds to such an extent that any change would unsettle their tranquility and disturb
their mental poise."
192 In In re Mancini, 89 Misc. 83, 87, 151 N.Y.S. 387, 389 (Sur. Ct. 1915), a court
that heavily emphasized the Roman Catholic "status" of a 14-year-old girl nevertheless
permitted her to remain in the custody of a Protestant minister largely because of the
child's strong preference for her new home. The court insisted, however, that the child
be given religious instruction in the Roman Catholic faith.
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sometimes even operate to contravene parental wishes. 1 3 Moreover,
it supports no religious interest of the adoptive parents. 194
The only interest really served by imputation is that of organized
religion. Although churches have a legitimate right to freedom from
state interference in their internal affairs and from state inhibition of
their activities, 195 they have no right to utilize the power of the state
to increase or maintain the size of their flock. To permit this would
breach the wall of separation between church and state. 196
The conclusion that imputation of religion lacks a primary secular
purpose is reinforced by an examination of Supreme Court decisions.
The Court has upheld Sunday closing laws because they provide a
day of rest and relaxation and "are of a secular rather than of a religious character.' 9 7 Similarly, state financial aid to parochial schools
for busing' 98 and for nonreligious textbooks' 99 has been sustained on
the child benefit theory: the purpose of such aid is to benefit the
children, not to aid parochial schools. The benefits involved-safer
transportation and improvement of educational resources-were secular in nature. In the case of imputation of religion, however, the benefit of enhancing the child's spiritual well-being is religious in nature,
not secular. Moreover, any aid received by the parochial schools as a
result of child benefit laws was incidental, whereas the benefits of imputation to organized religions are direct and primary.
In contrast, the Court has invalidated state laws and regulations
that lacked a clear secular purpose and were essentially religious in
nature. For example, laws requiring public officials to declare their
belief in a Supreme Being, 200 provisions for daily recitation of a nondenominational prayer 20 1 or Bible reading without comment in the
193 In In re Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
942 (1955), for example, the Roman Catholic mother's consent to the placement of her
children in a Jewish home could be seen as an implicit preference that the children be
brought up in the Jewish faith. Cf. Pfeffer, supra note 142, at 384.
194 For a discussion of how some potential parents may be disadvantaged by
religious protection statutes, see notes 129-39 and accompanying text supra.
195 Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the
Russian Orthodox Church of North America, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
196 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
197 McGowan v. Maryland, 866 U.S. 420, 444 (1961). See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 Us.
599 (1961).
198 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
199 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
200 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
201 Engle v. Vitale, 370 US. 421 (1962).
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public schools, 202 and provisions for a public school released-time program where religious classes were held on school premises 203 have been
struck down as violative of the first amendment. These laws are more
analogous to imputation than those upheld by the Court in that their
primary concern is promotion of religion.
The results in two decisions, Zorach v. Clauson20 4 and Walz v.
Tax Commissioner,20 apparently blur the line drawn in the other
cases between religious and secular purposes. Both cases, however, are
distinguishable from imputation. In Walz, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of tax exemptions for church property. Although
a secular purpose is difficult to discern, 206 several factors persuaded the
the Court. First, the Court found that the exemptions constituted only a
minimum and remote involvement between church and state. 207 Second,
there was no coercion involved;2 0 participation in religious activities
remained voluntary and was neither encouraged nor discouraged. Third,
and perhaps most important, was the overwhelming historical support
School Dist. v. Schempp, 874 U.S. 203 (1963).
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 33 U.S. 203 (1948).
204 348 U.S. 806 (1952).
205 897 US. 664 (1970).
206 Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, relied on the theory that exemptions
aid the many charitable, cultural, and other secular activities carried on by religious
organizations (id. at 687-89), but the majority opinion explicitly avoided this justification
(id. at 674). Instead, the Court accepted the theory "that certain entities that exist in a
harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its 'moral or mental
improvement,' should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation .... " Id.
at 672. Yet the promotion of morals rationale was previously rejected by the Supreme
Court in Schempp. Text accompanying notes 188-84 supra. Moreover, the Court apparently
confused the Everson "no-aid" test with the Schempp "secular-purpose" test, for it concluded that the fostering of moral improvement was not "sponsorship" of religion; it
did not conclude that this purpose was secular. 897 U.S. at 672.
The Walh case is susceptible to criticism because its logic is unsatisfactory and because
it apparently represents a dilution of both the Schempp test (by substituting minimal
state involvement for a clear secular purpose) and the Everson test (by allowing some
state aid, as long as that aid is not equivalent to state sponsorship). Id. The Court was
acutely aware of the tension between "logical analysis" and a "sensible and realistic application of the language of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 671. Churches are exempt
from taxation in all 50 states and have been exempt from federal taxation for over
75 years. Id. at 676. Thus, one commentator could predict more than two decades ago
that "a decision that exemption is 'establishment' seems more logical than probable."
Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HAav. L. REv. 1306, 1338 (1949). It is
unlikely that the unique concatenation of circumstances exemplified in the church tax
exemption case will be easily duplicated; thus, it would be a mistake to view Walz as a
permanent relaxation of the establishment clause tests.
207 897 U.S. at 676.
208 Id. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring).
202
203
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for such exemptions. 209 All three factors are lacking in the case of imputation of religion.
In Zorach, the Court upheld a public school released-time program
210
in which the religious classes were conducted outside the schools.
In comparison with imputation, two crucial differences emerge. In
Zorach, the initiative for providing religious instruction derived from
the parents, who requested the release of their children, with the state
merely "accommodating" itself to the request; 211 in imputation, the
initiative derives from the state, and parental acquiescence, if any, is
coincidental. Furthermore, the Court in Zorach stressed that attendance
at religious classes was voluntary,2 12 whereas the element of compulsion is glaring in the imputation situation. In Zorach, the Court noted
that government may not "use secular institutions to force one or some
religion on any person"; 213 this is precisely what government does when
214
it commands imputation of religion to children.
The second part of the dual test requires "a primary effect that

neither advances nor inhibits religion." 215 Imputation of religion
fails to meet this test as well, for its primary effect is to exalt religion
over nonreligion by imposing on children a religious status they might
otherwise not have. Moreover, the extent of the effect is tied to a

judicial propensity to find religious affiliations where their actual
existence is dubious. 21 6 The apparent egalitarianism of the statutes
209 "lAin unbroken practice of according the exemption to churches, openly and by
affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly
cast aside." Id. at 678. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, also emphasized this
factor: "Rarely if ever has this Court considered the constitutionality of a practice for
which the historical support is so overwhelming." Id. at 681.
210 343 U.S. at 314-15.
211 Id. at 314; Ramsey, supra note 145, at 683.
343 US. at 311.
212 "No one is forced to go to the religious classroom .
213 Id. at 314.
214 Furthermore, due to the lack of clarity in the Court's reasoning and the essentially pragmatic basis of the decision, Zorach is a relatively weak precedent and "has
not been heavily relied on in later cases." Note, The MinisterialDraft Exemption and the
Establishment Clause, 55 CORNELL L. R.Et. 992, 1003 (1970).
215 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
216 For example, in In re Korte, 78 Misc. 276, 277, 139 N.Y.S. 444, 445 (County Ct.
1912), the court presumed that the natural parents, whose identity was unknown, were
Catholic because the children were originally surrendered to a Catholic institution. This
case exemplifies judicial favoring of religion over nonreligion. Although the adoptive
father expressed belief in the doctrines of Christianity, while shunning ties, to organized
religion, the court relied on "some evidence ... that he is what is termed a 'free-thinker.'"
Id. at 277, 139 N.Y.S. at 444. The court concluded that "it would be a manifest wrong
to permit these children to be brought up in a condition of pagan unbelief and atheism." Id. at 280, 139 N.Y.S. at 446.
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is belied by the fact that lack ,of religion is never mentioned as a
21 7
category worthy of imputation.
Imputation of religion, therefore, whether mandatory or discretionary, constitutes an establishment of religion in violation of the
first amendment.
3. Free Exercise of Religion
Matching requirements make it more difficult for some people than
others to adopt a child. For example, members of minority religions,
atheists and agnostics, and couples of mixed marriages are disadvantaged because they must overcome obstacles in the adoption process that
do not exist for others.2 18 Imputation requirements mean that virtually
all children available for adoption will sport a religious tag,21 9 usually
one of the two major American faiths. 220 Often the result is that potential adoptive parents in any of the disadvantaged categories have to
misrepresent their religious affiliations, 221 or they will be denied a
child from an authorized agency 222 and forced to resort to independent
sources. The Supreme Court has proclaimed that neither the state nor
the federal government
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining
or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
223
or non-attendance.
In a very real sense, religious protection statutes force people to profess a belief in religion and to go to church2 24 if they wish to adopt
217 In In re Goldman, 831 Mass. 647, 653, 121 N.E.2d 843, 846 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 942 (1955), the court observed: "If neither parent had any religion we suppose

the statute would have no application." In other words, the court would not require
that the child of such parents be placed with adoptive parents who lack a religious
affiliation, and might even refuse to allow such a placement.
218 Note 129 and accompanying text supra.
219 This is so because almost all Americans have a religious element somewhere in
their backgrounds, even if they do not actively practice that religion, and, absent strong
evidence to the contrary, a mother who does not expressly indicate otherwise will be
considered to be of the same religion as her parents. See note 169 supra.
220 See note 129 supra.
221 See notes 182-83 and accompanying text supra.
222 Sometimes an adoption will nonetheless be permitted if the parents agree to bring
up the child in a specific faith. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in such
conditions, see notes 140-45 and accompanying text supra.
223 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
224 R,. IsAAc, supra note 35, at 12; notes 132-34 and accompanying text supra. The
element of coercion was an important factor in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 US.
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through an authorized agency, and the statutes punish them by disallowing an adoption in cases where there is no match. Admittedly,
the state is not required to provide legal machinery for adoption; but
having done so, it must make the benefits available to all equally, with225
out religious requirements, or it violates the free exercise clause.
The right to free exercise of religion is not absolute; it may be
circumscribed where the public interest so demands. 226 But, although
government is free to regulate conduct that is commanded by religious
227
scruples, it is "deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion."
Imputation severely impinges on potential parents' freedom to believe
and is in no way justified by the state's interest in prohibiting "actions
.. . in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."228 Imputation of religion, therefore, limits adoptive parents' free exercise
of religion in violation of the first amendment.
B. Parental Religious Preference
In an attempt to liberalize religious requirements in adoption,
some states have recently amended their statutes by providing for the
effectuation of parental religious wishes. 229 An argument frequently
advanced in favor of such provisions is that the first amendment requires that the religious wishes of the parents be honored by government, and any state law that fails to respect these preferences violates
the natural parents' free exercise of religion. 280 While in most circumstances parents have a right to control the religious upbringing of
203 (1948) (released-time program with religious instruction on school premises unconstitutional), and in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624 (1943)
(public school requirement of flag salute unconstitutional).
225 Similarly, the state is not compelled to provide unemployment compensation, but,
once having done so, the benefits must be available to all regardless of their religious
convictions, even where such convictions are the cause of unemployment. Sherbert v.

Verner, 374 US. 398 (1963).
226 Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 US. 145, 164 (1878).
227 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624, 642 (1943).
228 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); see Braunfield v. Brown, 366
US. 599, 603 (1961). Such freedom may be restricted "only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect." West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624, 639 (1943).
229 Notes 49-58 and accompanying text supra.
230 Note, supra note 119, at 784; Polier, Religion and Child, N.Y.L.J., May 25, 1970,
at 4, col. 8.
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their children,231 the situation is more complicated in the context of
adoption because of the two sets of parents-natural and adoptive
-involved.
Natural parents, of course, must be protected in adoption proceedings. Social welfare literature on the subject includes confidentiality and freedom from duress among the interests that must be
protected, 232 but the right to continued control over the child's religious upbringing is conspicuously absent. Such control is an anomaly
in a legal proceeding designed to sever permanently and completely
one parent-child relationship and to create a new relationship between
the adoptive parents and child. 233 Moreover, since a parent relinquishes
all parental rights and responsibilities when her 234 child is legally
adopted, it should follow that the right to continued control of the
child's religious upbringing is also relinquished. The argument that
the state must effectuate parental religious wishes to comply with the
dictates of the first amendment cannot be maintained.
This does not mean, however, that the state must not effectuate
such preferences. There are a number of policy reasons in favor of
parental preference statutes. Some parents who are compelled to give
up their children possess strong religious convictions. If such a parent is
told that an authorized agency cannot give any consideration at all
to her religious desires, she may choose to keep the child, 23 5 even
though she is unable to care for it adequately,236 or she may opt for
a more hazardous independent placement.237 In narrowly defined circumstances, therefore, in recognition of parental feelings and in con231 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624, 630-31 (1943); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); cf. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 US.
284, 298 (1927); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
232 CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMECA, supra note 180, at 15-16; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAwYERs AND SOCIAL WoRKERs, supra note 128; Reid, supra note 127, at 28.
233 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 20.10.120(a) (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 919 (1953);
UNIFORM ADOPTION AcT § 12; H. GOLDBERG, LEGtSLATIVE GuIEs FOR THE TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 3, 9 (Children's

Bureau Pub. No. 394, 1961).
234 The natural parent is characterized as female since approximately 80% of the
children adopted by nonrelatives are surrendered by unmarried mothers. AzmtmucAN
ACADEMY OF PmirAT~ics, supra note 117, at 2.
235 Survey, Adoption Agencies.

236 Unmarried mothers, for example, face serious problems in providing adequate
care for their children. See Reid, supra note 127, at 34. Moreover, "reports by social workers and sociologists alike have affirmed that at the present time the white unmarried

mother who keeps her child is in general more disturbed and less able to provide a
normal life for her baby than the mother who chooses adoption." R. ISAAC, supra note 35,
at 57.

237 See notes 135-39 and accompanying text supra.
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sideration of the child's welfare, states may make some provision for
effectuation of parental preferences. The remaining question is in what
circumstances such preferences should be honored.
1. The Mandatory Approach
The mandatory interpretation given to imputation statutes may
well be applied to the new parental preference amendments. 238 This
interpretation means that matching is practicable if there are a number
of families of the matching religion that might hypothetically wish to
adopt the child or if there is an institution that services children of
that religion in the area. 239 This interpretation is of dubious constitutionality.
Parental preference statutes meet the first principal test of neutrality under the establishment clause, 240 provided that all religious
wishes, including those requesting minority sect, atheistic, and agnostic
homes are honored. If the latter parental requests are not respected,
however, then the statutes would exalt religion over nonreligion in
violation of the establishment clause. The result under the second,
purpose-effect test 241 is somewhat more uncertain. Mandatory interpretations may lead to harmful consequences to the child, such as delays
in placement, placement in a less suitable home, disruption of a beneficial on-going relationship, and multiple placements. The only secular
purpose of honoring parental requests is to promote the child's welfare
by allowing it to be suitably placed. Where a mandatory interpretation
is permitted to defeat this goal, the secular purpose of the statute is
eliminated and its primary purpose can then only be religious. Further,
the statutory effect would clearly be to encourage religion to the
detriment of the child's temporal welfare.
A mandatory interpretation may continue to make adoption more
difficult for potential parents of minority religious backgrounds. If so,
such an interpretation constitutes a burden on the adoptive parents'
free exercise of religion in violation of the first amendment. 242 Insofar
as mandatory interpretations lead to less satisfactory placements, they
constitute a burden on the child as well and can be viewed as a violation of the child's first amendment rights.
The mandatory interpretation may also violate the equal protec238 See note 55 supra.
239 In re Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 650, 121 N.E.2d 843, 844-85 (1954), cert. denied,

248 US. 942 (1955); notes 86-89 and accompanying text supra.
240 Text accompanying note 167 supra.
241 Text accompanying note 171 supra.
242 Text accompanying notes 223-28 supra.
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tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the equal protection
clause usually requires only that a classification bear a reasonable
relation to a legitimate governmental objective, 24 3 the test is more
stringent where suspect classifications are involved. 24 4 In order to
justify such a classification, the state must prove a compelling state
interest.2 45 Religious classifications are suspect,2 4 6 and when a mandatory interpretation is applied it tends to be detrimental to the best
interests of the child. Deference to the religious wishes of the natural
parents can hardly be characterized as a compelling state interest
where the child's welfare is endangered and the interests of adoptive
parents are also jeopardized.
2. Proposalfor a Discretionary Approach to ParentalPreference
The discretionary approach to imputation makes religion a
subordinate consideration. 247 If applied to parental preference provisions, this approach can strike the most appropriate balance among
the interests of the parties in an adoption proceeding. 248 Such an approach should ensure that the child's temporal welfare will always be
the paramount consideration, that strong religious feelings of biological
parents will be honored as long as they are consistent with the best
interests of the child, and that the disadvantages suffered by adoptive
parents are minimized to the greatest possible extent. To satisfy these
requirements, however, certain changes in existing parental preference
243 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S.
141 (1940); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALxr. L. REV.

341, 344 (1949).
244 In this situation, legislation is subjected to a more "rigid scrutiny." Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
245 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
194 (1964). Under this test, the burden is on the state to establish that the public interest involved outweighs the disadvantages imposed on the affected groups. Chambers v.
Henderson City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1966).
240 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Tussman & tenBroek, supra
note 243, at 356. One commentator favors an equal protection approach to first amendment issues, arguing that the first amendment prohibits government from utilizing any
"classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden." P.
KuRLA,
supra note 177, at 18.
247 Note 39 and accompanying text supra.
248 Agency practices in states without a religious protection law indicate that religious factors may operate in a variety of ways even when not sanctioned by public
law (notes 91-93 and accompanying text supra); moreover, judicial decisions reveal that
any general formula for religious matching may give rise to a variety of substantive
applications (notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra). Thus, there is a need for state
statutes that confine the role played by religion in adoption to parental preference and
limit the discretion of administrators and judges in carrying out the religious preferences
of biological parents.
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statutes must be made. First, application of the discretionary approach
must be made explicit in the statute and should not depend on judicial
construction. 249 Second, the weight to be given the religious factor
should be clearly indicated in the statute. Finally, as explained below,
the degree of discretion granted to the administrative agency and the
judiciary must differ. The statutes regulating adoption agencies and
those governing judicial review of adoption petitions must make this
difference explicit.
Statutes regulating adoption agencies should provide:
1. That biological parents be given an opportunity to state a
religious preference for the child and that if no preference is
stated, the child must be placed without further regard to
religion;
2. That the parental preference so stated may be honored only
when consistent with the best interests of the child; and
3. That honoring parental preferences is not consistent with the
best interests of the child where
a. delays in placement may result; or
b. placement in a sectarian institution is the only available matching placement; or
c. the only available matching placement is less suitable
than placement in a home that does not match the
parental preference.
On the agency level, parental preference should operate in the
following way. The agency will inform the parents before surrender of
the child that they have the option to state a religious preference, but
that the agency will honor that preference only when consistent with
the best interests of the child.2 50 If a preference is stated, the agency
will follow its usual procedures in determining which available
homes are suitable for the adoptive child, 251 without regard for religion.
Then, if several equally suitable adoptive homes are immediately available, and one or more of these homes also matches the parental preference, the matching home must be chosen. But if the only available
adoptive home of the matching religion is less suitable, 252 or if any
249 For example, the recent amendments to the New York statutes do not explicitly
indicate which of the two interpretations, mandatory or discretionary, is intended. Notes
79-84 and accompanying text supra.
250 Many agencies now conform to this practice. Suruey, Adoption Agencies; text
accompanying note 101 supra.
251 See generally Note, supra note 119.
252 The suitability of a home is of particular importance with respect to handicapped
children; yet, even with such "hard-to-place" children, religious requirements have
been applied. In one case, for example,
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delay in placement is involved in finding an equally suitable home,253
then the child's temporal welfare must prevail over the parental preference with matching no longer required. Since placement in any
suitable home, even if religions are unmatched, is superior to placement in any institution, placement in an institution when an adoptive
home is available is not consistent with the best interests of the child.
Statutes governing judicial review of adoption petitions should
provide that an adoption petition shall be granted when consistent with
the best interests of the child, and that it is inconsistent with the best
interests of the child to deny a petition for adoption on religious
grounds. Judicial discretion with regard to the religious factor must
be more circumscribed than agency discretion because judicial review
occurs at a later stage of the adoption process. All states require a probationary period, usually six months or one year, during which the
adoptive parents have custody of the child before a petition for adoption may be granted.25 4 In view of the depth of relationship that usually
develops during probation, and the per se disadvantages of multiple
placements, placement with other adoptive parents would not be
2 55
beneficial to the child's welfare at this stage.
This discretionary approach disposes of the constitutional objections applicable to mandatory interpretations. Since the child's welfare
is the paramount consideration, the primary purpose and effect of the
statute remain secular, and establishment clause requirements are
met. 25 6 Since the vast majority of placements will have no religious
2 58
coloration, 257 all qualified petitioners are treated substantially equally,

[i]t seemed like the perfect combination: the little boy was almost blind, and the
potential father, an expert in rehabilitating the partly-sighted. Yet . . . the child
went on waiting. For the adoption agency was not willing to take a chance. The
couple was Unitarian; the child, Catholic.
Lake, supra note 123.
2U3 See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
254 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-14 (Smith-Hurd 1966); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:432 (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.27 (1971).
255 A petition for adoption may still be denied if, on grounds other than religion,
the court determines that the placement is not in the best interests of the child.
256 Any "aid" received by organized religions under this scheme would be de minimis.
See note 258 infra.
257 The presumption that religious considerations are significant elements in the decision of most biological parents to give up custody of the child is wholly without foundation. The facts dearly indicate that, quite to the contrary, the vast majority of parents
are anxious to have the child placed without religious restrictions. Note 258 infra.
One judge even commented that "most children placed for adoption come from irreligious parents who may, as an afterthought, consider religion when it is mentioned."

Survey, Judges.
258 In states where religious waivers are allowed, overwhelming numbers of biological parents sign, hoping thereby to increase their child's chances for an early placement
in the best possible home. In Arizona, for example, out of 266 children placed for
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thus satisfying equal protection requirements. 259 The burden on the
adoptive parent's free exercise of religion is also relaxed. Religious
protection statutes, then, can satisfy policy and constitutional considerations only if the relevant religion is determined by parental
preference rather than by imputation, and the scope of discretion
granted to the administering officials is clearly circumscribed. 26 0
3. ParentalPreference in New York
Although the New York amendment represents an improvement
over the old law, ambiguities and defects remain. The amendment
provides that the religious preferences of the natural mother, if the
child is illegitimate, or of the parents or living parent if the child is
born in wedlock "shall include wishes that the child be placed in
the same religion as the parent or in a different religion from the
parent or with indifference to religion or with religion a subordinate
consideration." 261 The statute further provides that absent expressed
preference, the
determination of the religious wishes, if any, of the parent, shall be
made upon the other facts of the particular case, and, if there is no
evidence to the contrary, it shall be presumed that the262parent
wishes the child to be reared in the religion of the parent.

There are three major defects in the New York law as presently
drafted. First, a mandatory interpretation of parental preference is
arguably still required. 263 That the law was intended to be given a
mandatory interpretation can be seen in the language of the amendment itself, which includes as one of the parental choices that the
child be placed "with religion a subordinate consideration." Since
adoption, 263 came from natural mothers who signed religious waivers. Survey, Adoption
Agencies. If it can be inferred from this data that most parents will not state a preference,
then most children should be freed for placement without regard to religion. As to
those children for whom no preference is stated, presumably the vast majority, adoptive
parents of all faiths and of no faith should be placed on an equal footing.
259 Text accompanying notes 243-46 supra.
260 This applies at least to public agencies. It may be argued that it should apply
to sectarian agencies as well, since adoption agencies perform a public function and their
practices therefore constitute state action. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 385-86
(1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). However, the public function argument has been accepted
by a majority of the Supreme Court only in exceptional situations. Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946) (private control of a town); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (private
control of primary elections). Although it is conceivable that a majority of the Court
will ultimately adopt this theory, a discussion of the possible extension of the concept
of state action is beyond the scope of this comment.
261 E.g., N.Y. Famy Cr. Acr § 116(g) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
262 Id.
263 Notes 81-84 and accompanying text supra.
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the mandatory interpretation is unconstitutional, 26 4 however, the state

cannot delegate the determination of the weight to be given the religious factor to the natural parents. In order to meet constitutional
requirements, the parental preference statute must be given a discretionary interpretation, and religion must always be a "subordinate
consideration."
Second, the statute is ambiguous as to whether atheism and agnosticism may be included in parental wishes. The phrase "or with indifference to religion" must be interpreted to include such wishes or
the statute will violate the establishment clause by favoring religion
26 5
over nonreligion.
Finally, the presumption that the natural parents desire the child
to be reared in their own religion presents serious policy and constitutional questions. An attempt to justify the provision has been made on
the theory that "given the nature of American society, the presumption
is not only reasonable but is one which is most likely to be in accord
with the parental wish." 266 The reasonableness of the presumption is
open to question from the viewpoints of both experience and common
sense. Many adoption agencies indicate that the majority of natural
parents sign religious waivers.2 67 It is likely that most parents would
prefer the assurance that their child will be raised in the best possible
home to the assurance that the child will be raised in their own religion.
Moreover, the purpose of the statute is to give recognition to the
religious feelings of biological parents and to deter independent placements. If no such wishes have been expressed, the deference rationale
no longer applies, and there is no danger of an independent placement.
With this secular purpose eliminated, the religious overtones of the
statute predominate, and it becomes suspect under the first amend2 68
ment.
CONCLUSION

At present, there is a confusing array of state statutes and inconsistent judicial interpretations, even within judisdictions, concerning
the religious element in adoption. This situation is all the more un264 Text accompanying notes 24046 supra.
265 Text accompanying note 167 supra.
266 Polier, supra note 230.
267 Note 89 supra.
268 Text accompanying note 171 supra.
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fortunate because religion is such a sensitive area and because the
interests of the parties most affected-the children and the adoptive
parents-are not adequately protected. Many state laws have the potential of sacrificing the child's best interests on purely religious grounds.
The rights of adoptive parents, which have become increasingly
significant due to recent shortages of available adoptive children, may
also be trammeled by religious protection statutes.
Policy and constitutional considerations require that the imputation of religion and the mandatory interpretation of parental preference laws be abolished. It has been suggested that this can be
accomplished by a more liberal judicial interpretation, but this merely
increases the probability that an unconstitutional law will receive an
occasional constitutional interpretation. 269 It must be made clear, either
through new legislation or a mandate from the Supreme Court, that
imputation of religion is not permissible and that effectuation of
parental religious wishes must always be subordinate to the child's
best interests.
The influence of religion is cultural as well as spiritual, and as
such it pervades our society. That the civil law must refuse primacy to
religious considerations does not mean that religion will cease to exert
its influence in American life. Rather, it means that "the religious
nature of our people" 270 will be neither state imposed nor state perpetuated, but a voluntary affirmance of private conviction and belief
271
in the American tradition of separation of church and state.
Ellen S. George and
Stephen M. Snyder
269 Where judicial discretion is unfettered, it becomes easier for a judge to permit
his own religious prejudices to intrude perhaps even unconsciously. In response to the
Cornell Law Review survey of family court judges, one judge commented:
The present New York statutes are designed to assure that the maximum number
of children are brought up in the Roman Catholic faith. A Protestant mother
signs a consent that the child be placed in a home regardless of religion. Such
a child is placed by the agencies in a Catholic home. The reverse never happens.
Survey, Judges. Moreover, judges may be subject to political pressures: "[A] great many
*..
judges are only fearful of incurring the disfavor of the electorate." Buttenweiser,
InternationalAspects, in THE CIiLD AT LAw, supra note 135, at 61, 63.
270 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
271 It is a postulate of American life, reflected specifically in the First Amendment to the Constitution but not there alone, that those [religious] beliefs and
institutions shall continue, as the needs and longings of the people shall inspire
them, to exist, to function, to grow, to wither, and to exert with whatever innate
strength they may contain their many influences upon men's conduct, free of the
dictates and directions of the state.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).

